The Inefficacy of Private Enforcement of Directors' Duties

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dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.contributor.authorAkanmidu, Oludara
dc.date.acceptance2019-09-18
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-24T14:07:57Z
dc.date.available2019-10-24T14:07:57Z
dc.date.issued2019-10-24
dc.descriptionThe file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.en
dc.description.abstractCompany directors play an important role in society. Their activities have significant effects on the interests of their companies, shareholders and other stakeholders. Consequently, the law regards them as fiduciaries and imposes duties which set out behavioural expectations. The private enforcement regime is the primary mechanism adopted by many common law jurisdictions for securing compliance with directors’ duties. The crucial question is whether this regime is effective in securing enforcement of directors’ duties. This article addresses this question by examining the fundamental weaknesses of the private enforcement regime. In exploring these weaknesses, it focuses on the UK and Nigerian experience. It crucially argues that the private enforcement regime, due to its weaknesses, is unable to provide deterrence and compensatory benefits. It is therefore ineffective as an enforcement mechanism for breach of directors’ duties. This article therefore concludes that there is need for a complementary enforcement regime.en
dc.funderNo external funderen
dc.identifier.citationAkanmidu, O. (2019) The inefficacy of private enforcement of directors’ duties. Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 44 (4), pp. 668-698en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/03050718.2019.1670705
dc.identifier.issn0305-0718
dc.identifier.urihttps://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/18655
dc.language.isoenen
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen
dc.researchinstituteCentre for Law, Justice and Societyen
dc.subjectDirectors' Dutiesen
dc.subjectPrivate Enforcementen
dc.subjectDeterrenceen
dc.subjectNigeriaen
dc.subjectweaknessesen
dc.titleThe Inefficacy of Private Enforcement of Directors' Dutiesen
dc.typeArticleen

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