Are bonds blind? Board-CEO social networks and firm risk

dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.contributor.authorFan, Yaoyao
dc.contributor.authorBoateng, Agyenim
dc.contributor.authorLy, Kim
dc.contributor.authorJiang, Yuxiang
dc.date.acceptance2021-02-26
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-24T09:46:58Z
dc.date.available2021-03-24T09:46:58Z
dc.date.issued2021-03-18
dc.descriptionThe file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.en
dc.description.abstractWe examine the impact of social networks between independent directors and the CEO on firm risk. Employing the deaths and retirements of socially connected independent directors and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act for two identifications, we find that board-CEO social networks have a positive impact on firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who are socially connected to their independent directors are motivated to adopt riskier investment, operating and financing strategies. This positive influence is more pronounced for prior under-performing firms and for CEOs with low power or overconfidence, indicating that board-CEO social networks act as career insurance and a power-enhancing mechanism to encourage managerial risk-taking.en
dc.funderNo external funderen
dc.identifier.citationFan, Y., Boateng, A., Ly, K., Jiang, Y. (2021) Are bonds blind? Board-CEO social networks and firm risk. Journal of Corporate Finance, 101922.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101922
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199
dc.identifier.urihttps://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/20719
dc.language.isoenen
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.researchinstituteFinance and Banking Research Group (FiBRe)en
dc.subjectBoard-CEO social networksen
dc.subjectInternal governance mechanismen
dc.subjectFirm risken
dc.subjectDeaths and retirements of directorsen
dc.titleAre bonds blind? Board-CEO social networks and firm risken
dc.typeArticleen

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