Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games

dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.contributor.authorStepanova, A.en
dc.contributor.authorxue, Lianen
dc.date.acceptance2018-12-16en
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-13T12:59:04Z
dc.date.available2019-02-13T12:59:04Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-25
dc.descriptionopen access articleen
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.en
dc.exception.reasonThe output was published as gold open accessen
dc.funderEPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council)en
dc.identifier.citationCartwright, E., Stepanova, A. and Xue, L. (2019) Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21 (5), pp. 903-922en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12359
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/17540
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.projectidEP/P011772/1en
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.researchgroupInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Valueen
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)en
dc.subjectpublic gooden
dc.subjectlearning directionen
dc.subjectimpulse balanceen
dc.subjectgame theoryen
dc.titleImpulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good gamesen
dc.typeArticleen

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