Security of distance-bounding: A survey


Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.


The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link


Information security, cryptography, contactless, relay attacks, distance fraud, terrorist fraud, distance-bounding, proximity check, mafia fraud


Avoine, G., Bingöl, M.A., Boureanu, I., čapkun, S., Hancke, G., Kardaş, S., Kim, C.H., Lauradoux, C., Martin, B., Munilla, J., Peinado, A., Rasmussen, K.B., Singelée, D., Tchamkerten, A., Trujillo-Rasua, R. and Vaudenay, S. (2018) Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey. ACM Computing Surveys, 51(5), Article 94.


Research Institute

Cyber Technology Institute (CTI)