Security of distance-bounding: A survey

Abstract

Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

Description

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link

Keywords

Information security, cryptography, contactless, relay attacks, distance fraud, terrorist fraud, distance-bounding, proximity check, mafia fraud

Citation

Avoine, G., Bingöl, M.A., Boureanu, I., čapkun, S., Hancke, G., Kardaş, S., Kim, C.H., Lauradoux, C., Martin, B., Munilla, J., Peinado, A., Rasmussen, K.B., Singelée, D., Tchamkerten, A., Trujillo-Rasua, R. and Vaudenay, S. (2018) Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey. ACM Computing Surveys, 51(5), Article 94.

Rights

Research Institute

Cyber Technology Institute (CTI)