Observation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigation

Date

2018-04-13

Advisors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Elsevier

Type

Article

Peer reviewed

Yes

Abstract

We experimentally disentangle two potential sources for endogenous social interactions effects. By comparing groups where the aggregate behavior is publicly observable with those where it is not we can measure the size of any endogenous observation effect. By comparing connected with disconnected groups we can measure the size of any endogenous contagion effect. Results are provided for both a coordination game and social dilemma. We find strong evidence of an endogenous observation effect in the coordination game but not social dilemma. We find no evidence of an endogenous contagion effect in either game. While our results point towards a conformity effect we argue that information on group behavior primarily acts as a coordinating device which may be reflected in changes in beliefs.

Description

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.

Keywords

Social interactions effects, social norms, minimum effort game, contagion, prisoners dilemma

Citation

Cartwright, E. and Singh, T.B. (2018) Observation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigation. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 74, pp.151-160

Rights

Research Institute

Institute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)