The Logics and Limits of 'Collaborative Governance' in Nantes: Myth, Ideology and the Politics of New Urban Regimes

Abstract

This article characterizes and evaluates a paradigm case of urban collaborative governance: the so-called ‘Nantes model’. Stressing its positioning in the particular tradition of French politics, and drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory, this article demonstrates how the myth of the ‘jeu à la Nantaise’ (the “Nantes game”) informs a discourse of urban collaborative governance with a distinctive triad of policy goals. In the context of fiscal tightening and multiple crises, this governance practice involves various strategies designed to incorporate neighbourhoods and communities in the co-production of public policies in a pragmatic way. Analyzing the grammar and forms of these practices reveals that ‘co-governance’ in Nantes functions as a ‘doctrinal abridgement’, leading to a growing managerialization in an increasingly codified system of community participation. We thus conclude that one line of flight in the ‘Nantes model’ signifies a movement away from an image of collaborative pragmatism as a complex praxis of governing to an ideology that conceals the complications and messiness of governing in a collaborative manner.