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   <dc:title>Involuntary action and criminal responsibility.</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Claydon, Lisa</dc:creator>
   <dcterms:abstract>This thesis considers the concept of involuntary action in the criminal law. In particular it&#xd;
examines the defence of automatism. The discussion of the defence by the courts in England&#xd;
and Wales and jurisprudential commentary regarding involuntary action are considered.&#xd;
Present legal definitions of involuntary action do not take account of current scientific or&#xd;
philosophical debates relating to consciousness and the science of the mind. It is argued that&#xd;
modern neuroscientific definitions of consciousness are useful to the criminal law. They&#xd;
suggest how consciousness is used by the brain to assist in the carrying out of tasks and to&#xd;
monitor the interaction between the individual and the world in which her behaviour takes&#xd;
place. They provide evidence that conscious awareness of tasks differs according to the&#xd;
complexity of the task undertaken and the experience of a particular person in performing a&#xd;
particular task. On this view conscious awareness will exist in varying degrees according to the&#xd;
task which is being undertaken and the person performing that task.&#xd;
It is argued that a purely mechanistic or reductionist evaluation of consciousness will not assist&#xd;
in defining criminal responsibility. The thesis also examines differing types of explanation of&#xd;
action. These include philosophical definitions of action and discussions of how consciousness&#xd;
relates to action. The opinions of courts in five other jurisdictions on certain approaches to the&#xd;
automatism defence are considered. The problems of combining legal and philosophical&#xd;
definitions are discussed. A revised test of involuntariness is suggested.&#xd;
The research findings contribute to the fund of knowledge in a number of ways. Firstly they&#xd;
review the case law of automatism in England and Wales and certain aspects of the defence of&#xd;
automatism in five other jurisdictions. Secondly the research examines the relevance of modern&#xd;
neuroscientific research and the philosophy of consciousness in relation to the criminal law's&#xd;
approach to involuntary action. Finally the research findings are utilised to propose a new test&#xd;
of involuntariness.</dcterms:abstract>
   <uketdterms:institution>De Montfort University</uketdterms:institution>
   <dcterms:issued>2001</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>Thesis or dissertation</dc:type>
   <uketdterms:qualificationlevel>Doctoral</uketdterms:qualificationlevel>
   <uketdterms:qualificationname>PhD</uketdterms:qualificationname>
   <dc:language xsi:type="dcterms:ISO639-2">en</dc:language>
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