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Trade unions, digitalisation and country effects: a comparative study of banking in Norway and the UK

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Abstract:	The resurgence of debate around digitalisation and work has seen the role of unions in the 'social shaping of technology' attracting renewed interest. A key question concerns how far national institutions influence unions' ability to shape digitalisation in particular sectors and workplaces. Using a multi-level analysis that emphasises the inter-relationships between institutions, union power, resources and agency, this article compares the role of two unions in the banking sector in Norway and the UK. Drawing on interviews with national officers and workplace reps, it addresses their involvement in decision-making processes and ability to influence outcomes in relation to digital monitoring and surveillance. The research findings highlights the continued salience of 'country effect' as evidenced by the Norwegian union's more prominent role in shaping better worker outcomes.

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Introduction

Debates over the potential impact of digitalisation on employment have led to a renewed focus on technological change and how it can be shaped to produce different outcomes (Wajcman, 2017). Public policy, institutions and social actors influence, even if indirectly, the development and use of technology, and its impact on work (AuthorsA; Thompson, 2020; Howcroft and Taylor, 2022). An emerging area of research is the contemporary role of trade unions and the extent to which they can shape digitalisation to achieve better outcomes for workers.

In many European countries, the context of union decline, deregulatory processes and eroding worker power (Baccaro and Howell, 2017), present major challenges for unions in influencing digitalisation. Given that unions have often struggled to engage with technology even in periods of relative strength (Deutsch, 1986), the present situation hardly gives cause for optimism (Murray et al., 2020; Martinez-Lucio et al., 2021). There are fears that unions could be further marginalised by the growth of platform and gig work, and the loss of jobs from unionised sectors (Doellgast and Wagner, 2022). On a positive note, some unions are successfully using digital tools for organising and engaging new groups of workers (Vandaele, 2018). There is less research, however, examining unions' role in the implementation and use of digital technology in the workplace. The few available studies focus mainly on 'Industry 4.0' in engineering and automotive (Haipeter, 2020; Cirillo et al., 2020), while research in other parts of the economy is limited (AuthorsD).

International comparisons are critical in examining 'country-effect' and identifying factors that enable or constrain union influence in sectors and workplaces (AuthorsA; Doellgast and Wagner, 2022). This article explores the impact of country differences in labour market-

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3 related regulations and institutions on unions' ability to influence digitalisation in the banking
4 sector. It adopts an analytical approach that emphasises the inter-relationships between
5 institutions, union power, resources and agency at multiple levels in shaping outcomes
6 (Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020; AuthorsB). The impact of national institutions, along with the
7 relative power and opportunities available to unions, are likely to be uneven across sectors
8 (Bechter et al, 2012, AuthorsC). A central question, therefore, is how far are unions able to
9 influence digitalisation in specific sectors and workplaces when comparing countries with more
10 or less conducive institutional environments, and what might this tell us about the conditions
11 under which unions can make a difference.
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24 As an early adopter of digital technologies, banking is an important sector to examine
25 (Umans et al, 2018). As Bechter et al. (2012) note, internationalised sectors with few large
26 companies and strong EU-level regulations may display more similarities in industrial relations
27 structures than localised services. Banking tends to fit this category, with unionisation rates
28 and collective bargaining coverage typically being much higher than in private services. We
29 might, therefore, expect more convergence in union involvement in digitalisation. That said,
30 recent studies have found national differences in unions' ability to deal with bank restructuring
31 associated with digitalisation, particularly around job losses and redundancy (Kirov and Thill,
32 2018; Kornelakis et al., 2022). However, current research has yet to examine banking unions'
33 ability to influence other work outcomes, such as new forms of digital monitoring and
34 surveillance.
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49 This article compares two banking unions in Norway and the UK, countries selected
50 for their starkly contrasting institutional environments and union power resources. Norway is
51 noted for its strong unions, enduring 'tripartite' model of social dialogue, and multi-level
52 collective bargaining (Løken et al., 2013). There are strong institutional supports that bolster
53 union organisation and co-determination mechanisms that include involvement in technical
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3 change. The UK is a neo-liberal economy with a lightly regulated labour market, where unions
4 have suffered significant decline and marginalisation (AuthorsC). Unions lack consultation and
5 involvement rights over technology, except in cases involving collective redundancies, and
6 have to rely on their own ability to make company and workplace agreements. While we would
7 expect, therefore, a stronger role for unions in Norway, recent studies indicate sector matters.
8 In hospitality and retail, there appears to be little joint workplace decision-making (Alsos and
9 Trygstad, 2018), and unions' role in digitalisation is weak, with some similarities to the UK
10 (AuthorsD).

21 The article addresses three research questions. First, how do the two banking unions
22 attempt to influence decisions around the introduction and use of digital technologies? Second,
23 to what extent are the unions effective in shaping outcomes,? Third, how far does national
24 institutional and regulatory context explain any differences found, focusing specifically on
25 digital monitoring and surveillance? The study contributes to an analysis of 'country effect'
26 and provides critical insights into the factors that support or hinder unions in shaping
27 digitalisation.

37 The following section outlines the analytical framework and draws out relevant themes
38 from current studies on union influence on digital technologies in the workplace. A brief
39 overview of digitalisation in the banking sector and the industrial relations context in Norway
40 and the UK is then provided. The methods section outlines the interviews with union officers
41 and representatives in the two unions that formed the basis of the research. The findings are
42 discussed, comparing union involvement in digitalisation and their impact on outcomes for
43 workers. The discussion and conclusion consider the role of 'country effect', and highlight
44 wider analytical and research implications emerging from the study.

Unions and digitalisation

Despite liberalisation and deregulation pressures (Baccaro and Howell, 2017), the persistence of distinctive national labour market institutions suggests there may still be a ‘country effect’ on unions’ ability to shape digitalisation (AuthorsA). Unions have varied degrees of institutional power derived from national systems, including labour market regulation, corporate governance and public policy, shaped by struggles between the state, capital and labour (Wright, 2000; Refslund and Arnholtz, 2022). These country effects have been reflected in past evidence of stronger union involvement in technical change in Germany and Nordic workplaces, compared to neo-liberal countries which lack institutional supports and social dialogue (Deutsch, 1986).

The ability of unions to draw on strong national institutional supports to shape digitalisation, however, is likely to be variable across sectors and workplaces (Bechter et al 2012). At the same time, unions in countries that lack a supportive environment may still be able to exert influence. Union power in different sectors and workplaces depends partly on the extent of these institutional supports but also on structural and associational power (Wright, 2000; Refslund and Arnholtz, 2022; Rego, 2022). Structural power is based primarily on workers’ labour market position and location within the organisation and value chain. Those less easily replaceable or working in areas of critical importance are seen as providing unions with greater structural power. Associational power derives from a union’s ability to organise and mobilise workers, which also links into their own strategic approach, capabilities and resources (Lévesque and Murray, 2010; Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020). The interrelationships between these different forms of power are complex and varied.

Current research examining unions’ role in the implementation and use of digital technologies in traditional workplaces offer some insights into the relative importance of ‘country effect’. Primarily focused on Industry 4.0 in manufacturing, the emerging evidence

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2
3 suggests greater union involvement in countries with strong institutional and embedded forms
4 of worker representation, such as Italy and Germany (Cirillo et al., 2020; Haipeter, 2020).
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6 Rutherford (2021) argues that greater union influence in Germany, compared with the US,
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8 reflects co-determination rules and strong associational power. Haipeter (2020), for example,
9
10 points to the ability of German unions to partner with Works Councils to bring forward new
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12 agreements. The adaption of existing arrangements is also emphasised in Gasparri and
13
14 Tassanari's (2020:813) research, where Italian unions were found to be most effective in the
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16 sphere of collective bargaining when extending 'already established institutions and practices.'
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18 Even with relatively conducive institutional environments, unions' engagement at the
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20 workplace is variable across companies, ranging from the proactive to the defensive, and is
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22 often late in the process (Cirillo et al., 2020; Rego, 2022).
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28 Existing studies on Industry 4.0 focus more on union involvement than identifying how
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30 unions affect work outcomes beyond that of potential job losses. One area where evidence is
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32 emerging concerns unions' impact on digital monitoring and surveillance. Electronic
33
34 performance monitoring is not new, and there are many examples where unions have
35
36 successfully resisted or limited its use (Kiss and Mosco, 2005; Lloyd et al., 2010). However,
37
38 digital tracking software, data analytics and algorithmic management provide management
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40 with an increasing set of tools that are more intrusive and which can be applied in a wider array
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42 of situations (Moore et al., 2018). Unions have been addressing their concerns through social
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44 dialogue at national and international levels, and have had some success in bringing forward
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46 collective agreements (Eurofound, 2020). Studies are also gradually emerging at the
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48 workplace, demonstrating that unions can restrict new forms of digital monitoring by building
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50 on existing agreements and approaches (Cirillo et al., 2020; Doellgast et al., 2023).
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56 A number of themes emerge from the literature: the importance of established
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58 institutionalised structures at the workplace and unions' ability to adapt these to address
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3 digitalisation; union representatives having sufficient knowledge and resources to understand
4 and intervene in the process (Haipeter, 2020; Rutherford, 2021); and differences in company
5 approach towards unions linked to their business models (Cirillo et al., 2020). Despite
6 continued concerns about the late involvement of unions, there are indications that unions can
7 draw on different forms of power to influence implementation and outcomes, including digital
8 monitoring. However, with most research focused on a few sectors and countries, an important
9 question is whether these themes have broader resonance.
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21 **Digitalisation in banking**

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23 Digital technologies have long been a feature of banking from the adoption of automated teller
24 machines (ATMs) to the establishment of call centres and telephone banking in the 1980s
25 (Taylor and Bain, 2001). As part of wider restructuring, many bank employees experienced
26 deteriorating job quality, notwithstanding differences between countries, banks and groups of
27 workers. Workers in countries with strong collective institutions were generally found to have
28 fared better than in neoliberal countries (Regini et al., 1999; Lloyd et al., 2010). Even in the
29 UK, however, some unions were able to reduce individual targets in call centres and restrict
30 the use of disciplinary procedures for ‘under-performance’ (Taylor and Bain, 2001).
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42 In recent years, the extension of online and mobile banking has enabled banks to
43 remove most manual processing of cheques, bank transfers and cash handling (Anderson,
44 2020), and to accelerate branch closures. Robot process automation (RPA) and algorithmic
45 decision-making are among the digital technologies that allow certain work processes to be
46 automated, such as loan applications and security checks. These developments present similar
47 challenges to unions as in previous periods of technical change, with expectations of major
48 threats to employment and shifts in job tasks. One aspect that is different today is the potential
49 for management to use new digital tools to extend and deepen monitoring and surveillance. In
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3 some cases, these can be ‘invisible’ and installed without workers’ knowledge, rendering them
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5 difficult for unions to detect and act against (Bråten et al., 2023:6).
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8 Contemporary studies in banking, although relatively few, find some differences in
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10 work outcomes. However, they are often unclear as to why they have come about and if unions
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12 have been involved. In some cases, branch workers are found to be undertaking more complex
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14 work, with a greater focus on customers (Värlander and Julien, 2010; Dølvik et al., 2020).
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16 Others report jobs becoming increasingly standardised, with reduced discretion and greater use
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18 of targets (Laaser, 2016; Perez and Martin, 2018). Work intensification is a common theme
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20 (NFU, 2018; Dølvik et al., 2020, Perez and Martin, 2018), alongside concerns surrounding the
21
22 effects of enhanced forms of digital monitoring and surveillance (Lockwood, 2018; Murphy
23
24 and Cullinane, 2021).
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28 International comparative studies have uncovered country differences in unions’ ability
29
30 to influence employment outcomes, suggesting the continued importance of institutional
31
32 power. In France and Luxembourg, sectoral bargaining and forms of neo-corporatism have
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34 enabled banking unions to be more successful in resisting job cuts than in the UK (Kirov and
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36 Thill, 2018; Kornelakis et al., 2022). Perez and Martin (2018) go beyond job losses, touching
37
38 upon the role of banking unions in the use of digital technologies at the workplace. They find
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40 evidence that French and Spanish unions are involved in managing the ‘consequences of
41
42 innovation’, such as working time issues, albeit with little input into ‘upstream’ decision-
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44 making (2018:226). While comparative research remains sparse, these studies echo some issues
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46 raised by Industry 4.0 research, but are not systematically focused on union influence in the
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48 workplace.
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Sector context in Norway and the UK

There are substantial differences in the structure and industrial relations systems of the banking sector in Norway and the UK. Although banking is relatively concentrated in both countries, it is more so in Norway, where *Den Norske Bank* (DNB), which is part-owned by the government, accounts for around 30% of the retail and corporate market (Norges Bank, 2022). Small savings banks comprise 45% of the retail and a third of the corporate market. Traditionally mutually owned, they are expected to support their local communities, with some forming two alliances – *Sparebank* and *Eika* – to share group services. In the UK, the big four commercial banks – HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), NatWest and Barclays – account for approximately two-thirds of personal and business accounts. They operate alongside large and small banks, digital-only services, and building societies. In both countries, the long-term decline in the number of retail branches has accelerated over the last decade (Anderson, 2020; Booth 2022), with banking employment falling by 16% in the UK and 7% in Norway between 2009 and 2019.

In Norway, industrial relations in banking are highly organised. Nearly all employers are members of the employers' association, *Finans Norge*. Union density in finance stands at 58%, and 81% of workers are covered by collective bargaining (compared to private sector averages of 38% and 45% respectively) (Nergaard, 2022). The Basic Agreements between *Finans Norge* and the unions, *Finansforbundet* (FFB) and LO, along with the Working Environment Act, provide the regulatory framework for industrial relations, working conditions, and rights to be consulted and involved in technological decisions. The Central (sector) Agreement covers pay and working conditions, while company agreements specify local wage supplements and build upon the Basic and Central agreements.

In the UK, there is no employer association that negotiates with workers or any sector bargaining. At just 19 percent, union density in finance is lower than the national average of

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3 23 percent but substantially higher than in the private sector (13%). There are multiple and
4 competing unions, many having emerged from company-based staff associations (Tailby et al.,
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6 2007). Collective bargaining coverage is 31 percent in finance, compared to 21% in the private
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8 sector (DBEIS, 2022), although most of the larger banks and building societies have collective
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10 agreements. Gall (2017:17) argues that since the financial crisis ‘management dominance and
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12 union weakness’ have led to worsening terms and conditions of employment, despite a
13
14 predominant model of union-management partnership. In Norway, banks are said to have fared
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16 relatively well. Relations between management and unions have traditionally been
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18 ‘consensual’ within a strongly institutionalised environment (Rolandsson, 2020:77).
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24 Notwithstanding some sectoral commonality (Bechter et al., 2012), differences in
25
26 unions’ institutional power would still lead us to expect a significant country effect. Norwegian
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28 unions have a range of supports they can potentially draw on to influence digitalisation which
29
30 are not available in the UK. Our analytical approach suggests that the ability of Norwegian
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32 unions to operationalise these supports will be linked to whether higher union membership is
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34 a reflection of strong associational power, and if this can be mobilised in relation to
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36 digitalisation.
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42 **Research Method**

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44 A comparative study of two banking unions was undertaken – *Finansforbundet* (FFB) in
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46 Norway, and *Accord* in the UK. The unions were selected for comparison as they only organise
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48 in financial services, and neither is politically aligned. FFB is the main union organising in the
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50 sector in Norway with around 30,000 members and is part of the union confederation,
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52 *Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund* (YS). The other union in the finance sector is *Handel*
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54 *og Kontor* (HK), part of the main confederation, *Landsorganisasjonen* (LO) which, unlike YS,
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56 has strong associations with the Labour Party. The employer organisation, *Finans Norge*,
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3 makes it harder for HK to obtain recognition than FFB. Accord is affiliated to the Trades Union
4 Congress, has around 23,000 members, and primarily organises in Lloyds Banking Group
5 (LBG) and TSB, a divestment. The two other unions organising in LBG are the general union,
6 Unite, affiliated to the Labour Party, and BTU, which was derecognised in 2015.
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12 The research was designed to explore union influence from the perspectives of those
13 active within the union at different levels, using semi-structured interviews. The study
14 specifically focused on digital technologies affecting workers in lower and intermediate-level
15 jobs across the banks. Initial contact and agreements were made with national officers who
16 provided lists of relevant individuals interested in participating in the research. Interviews were
17 sought with national and regional officers, and with senior union representatives who covered
18 a range of banking activities, such as retail, commercial and investment. Further contacts were
19 made through interviewees to ensure that reps at different levels and areas of banking were
20 covered, for example call centres, branches and back offices.
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33 Separate interview schedules were constructed for officers and representatives using key
34 themes drawn from the analytical framework, relevant literature and research questions. Areas
35 discussed ranged from information on union membership and organisation to identifying the
36 digital technologies introduced and the mechanisms through which involvement, if any, took
37 place. Interviewees were asked if they could identify any specific examples of changes or
38 outcomes that had been achieved as a result of union activity, whether at workplace level or as
39 part of the institutional environment. Twenty-four online interviews were conducted between
40 April and December 2021 (Table 1), with at least two of the research team present. Interviews
41 were in English, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, and were audio-recorded and transcribed
42 in full.
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3 Data were analysed primarily using a deductive approach, with interview transcripts
4 coded according to themes and sub-themes derived from the interview schedules. Some codes
5 were added as a result of patterns that emerged during data analysis, such as the role of data
6 protection legislation and informal union-management relations. Similarities and differences
7 were then identified within and across countries and used to address the core research
8 questions. The next two sections discuss the primary mechanisms through which the two
9 unions sought to influence digitalisation decisions, along with their ability to shape the use of
10 monitoring and surveillance technologies.
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24 **Structures of influence**

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26 The two unions are different in their approach, organisation and structure. In Norway, FFB
27 works with employers through the various formal mechanisms provided in legislation and
28 collective agreements. The highest level of elected representatives and officers negotiate the
29 main sector agreements with *Finans Norge*, while lead reps negotiate additional company-level
30 agreements. In the UK, Accord has a broad strategy of informal partnership working which
31 emphasises the importance of building relationships with senior managers. Negotiations and
32 consultations with the banks are centralised and multi-union, led by senior national officers.
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42 Clerical and customer service workers in call centres and branches are often highly
43 unionised in both countries; union density can reach up to 90 percent in some workplaces,
44 compared to relatively low levels among professional groups and in investment banking. FFB
45 has significantly more resources than Accord, with an estimated 1 union rep per 27 members
46 and 1 paid staff per 500 members, compared with corresponding ratios of 1 to 58 and 1 to 1150
47 respectively in Accord. Reps also receive more time-off for union duties. In DNB, for example,
48 there are nine full-time reps, covering around 10,000 members, while most senior Accord reps
49 had time-off agreements of 20-40%. These differences reflect, in part, the role that union
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3 representatives play in the two unions. Lead reps in FFB are the main union actors in individual
4 companies; most of those above the lowest level are involved in regular formal meetings with
5 managers, and take on individual member cases. In Accord, national officers assume the main
6 role in negotiations and consultations at company level, with regional officers typically
7 involved in grievance and disciplinary cases. In many cases, there are no meetings between
8 union reps and managers at the workplace.
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12 In Norway, the lead FFB reps across the four banks were generally positive about
13 relationships with employers. Several reps explained that this partly reflected the influence of
14 the ‘national model’. As one commented:
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17 You have the organisation, you have the union, and then you have the
18 government, and those are all agreeing on how to make the community the
19 best...The management appreciate us, likes our views and likes the
20 discussions, although we don't always agree. (N-DNB-branch-rep)
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23 In terms of digitalisation, interviewees identified representation on company boards, collective
24 agreements and legal rights as key avenues for formal access to decision-making, consultation
25 and involvement.
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28 Representation on company boards was seen by all the union reps as critical to giving
29 workers a voice and for the union to be involved in discussions around strategy and goals at an
30 early stage. Most lead reps also stated it gave them ‘leverage’ with senior management.
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33 we could take the members’ and the union’s voice into the board that makes
34 the biggest decisions, a future strategy for the next few years. (N-SBk3-lead-
35 rep)
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38 I think it’s really important because that gives us a lot of leverage to the
39 leaders in the company. (N-DNB-lead-rep2)
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42 The Working Environment Act provides a strong basis for worker representatives’ rights
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3 in relation to information and consultationⁱ over changes to work organisation and managerial
4 mechanisms to control workers (Section 9-1 and 9-2). The finance sector collective agreements
5 add to this through the right of union reps to be on project groups concerned with ‘information
6 technology’, and to have a joint role in how personal data is stored and used. There is also a
7 requirement for companies to make agreements on the use of systems for obtaining workload
8 and volume statistics. Each company agreement establishes specific rights and processes that
9 are enforceable by law. At DNB, a branch rep explained that high union membership rendered
10 it ‘easy to make good agreements’, with the union having a veto over any form of worker
11 measurement. A call centre rep also stressed the importance of the collective agreement:
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24 That's the first thing, we go to [with management], ‘look, we have an
25 agreement. This is not according to the agreement.’ So, the law is strong, but
26 almost every agreement we have is even stronger. (N-DNB-call-centre-rep)
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31 FFB reps across the banks explained they were always involved in big digital technology
32 projects, in some cases at an early stage of planning, although smaller changes could sometimes
33 be introduced without their knowledge:
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39 We have a big project where we need to buy a new big system. So as the
40 union representative I am in that steering group... it's the leader, top leaders
41 [management] in the company. (N-SBk1-lead-rep)
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45 Some small or foreign-owned companies were said to require more pressure from the union to
46 follow the agreements.
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50 There's a lot of situations where we, according to the collective agreement,
51 should have been involved a lot earlier...but they are getting better (N-
52 Fintech-rep)
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57 A key challenge is finding out when smaller-scale technology is being used which
58 requires actively engaged first-line reps across all workplaces. The data suggests the union rep
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3 structure is highly organised in FFB with regular meetings feeding up through the different
4 levels. Fortnightly and monthly meetings were reported among reps across the different banks.
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6 There was some variability among first-line reps, both in their involvement in the union and
7
8 their role in digital technology changes. More senior reps did not regard this as a major issue
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10 as the next level of union reps could ‘catch up’. It was considered relatively straightforward to
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12 resolve problems by referring to the collective agreement and the law and, if necessary, by
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14 escalating concerns within the company.
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20 We have to [say] ‘hey, wait a minute, we want to see what you're doing and
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22 the law requires it’...sometimes we have to go to top management and say
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24 ‘you have to tighten up your organisation’. (N-DNB-lead rep1)
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27 Reps argued there were benefits for managers in involving them as they could help deliver
28
29 better decisions. However, if union reps were excluded, many insisted they were prepared to
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31 slow down implementation by acting as a ‘breaking block’ (N-DNB-lead-rep1). In general,
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33 interviewees felt the law would protect their rights if there was a breach of the collective
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35 agreement.
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38 In the UK, senior officers in Accord described the relationship with both banks as an
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40 ‘informal partnership’. A national officer stressed that the union would challenge management
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42 if any proposals ran counter to workers’ interests.
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45 The bank is a better place if it’s stronger, [we are] not standing in the way of
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47 progress... the counter-side to that is they know full well [we] will challenge
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49 them vigorously, when we think that challenge is right. (UK-national-
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51 officer3)
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54 Another union officer reflected on the difficulties of partnership in an institutional context that
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56 favours the employer, but saw little alternative: ‘on the one hand, it can be seen as a weakness;
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3 on the other, I see it as the only way forward really, if you want to influence' (UK-national-
4 officer2).

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8 Accord has collective agreements with LBG and TSB, including provisions to negotiate
9 and consult over job security and performance management, although there is nothing
10 specifically around technology. The union officers emphasised the importance of the job
11 security agreements in dealing with employment decline. Since the start of the Covid-19
12 pandemic, the union had been meeting weekly with management to discuss ways to mitigate
13 job losses associated with branch closures and business restructuring. These meetings focused
14 on redundancies and redeployment rather than influencing digitalisation processes.

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24 Senior management also meet with national officers a few times a year to be briefed on
25 business plans. Along with general consultation over employment policies, a union officer felt
26 there was 'an extraordinary level of engagement', without which 'it'd be rougher...more
27 process-driven and numbers-driven' (UK-national-officer1). Apart from regular meetings over
28 potential job losses, however, there were no formal mechanisms for consultation around the
29 use of technology. Although companies would generally inform the unions about larger digital
30 technology projects, one officer acknowledged that union influence was limited: 'I'm
31 struggling to think of an event we have shaped in the technology space' (UK-national-officer3).
32 Another stated that the union provided 'insights' and would highlight 'some potential
33 downstream consequences' for workers that management needed to consider when
34 implementing new technology (UK-national-officer1). Overall, the view from union officers
35 was that managers typically presented technology changes after decisions had been made.

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52 They won't ask us, 'Is it okay?' Not quite that good. But they will... come up
53 with what they want to do...sometimes I think it would be nicer to be
54 involved a bit earlier. (UK-national-officer2)

55
56
57
58
59 As Accord focuses on centralised discussions with company management, there is little
60

1
2
3 opportunity for workplace reps to be involved. Most reps felt they had no influence over
4
5 digitalisation.
6

7
8 No, we're not consulted... Sometimes we will be given a heads-up [from the
9
10 union]... that the bank is looking at a major change. But routine technology
11
12 coming in... we wouldn't tend to get notified. (UK-LBG-call-centre-rep1)
13

14
15 Union reps might be involved when the bank pilots a new technology, but only if selected by
16
17 local managers. Union officers can also provide feedback to company management if problems
18
19 are raised at a local level. One officer noted 'they're quite good at talking to us about some of
20
21 the pilots they run', but it was difficult to know whether such involvement made a difference
22
23 (UK-national-officer3).
24

25
26 The data shows distinctive differences between the opportunities and processes available
27
28 for the two unions to influence digital technology decisions. Although union interviewees in
29
30 both countries emphasise relationship-building and cooperation, union involvement in Norway
31
32 emerges as both more extensive and stronger. The next section examines whether this translates
33
34 into different outcomes in relation to digital monitoring and surveillance.
35
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39

40 **Monitoring and surveillance**

41
42 The use of digital technology to monitor workers was a major concern for both unions. FFB
43
44 has actively resisted the introduction of technology that can be used to undermine privacy,
45
46 intensify work, and identify 'under-performers'. While Accord does not have the legal or
47
48 collective agreement supports that FFB enjoys, it has also attempted to reduce new forms of
49
50 monitoring. How successful have these unions been in improving worker outcomes in this
51
52 area?
53
54

55
56 Norway has among the strongest data protection laws in the world, particularly in relation
57
58 to video and audio recording. The only use of audio recording mentioned was for meetings
59
60

1
2
3 with customers about investments, which is mandated by financial regulations. For other forms
4
5 of monitoring that can identify individuals, such as number of calls taken, a local collective
6
7 agreement is required. In many cases, union reps described how they had restricted the use of
8
9 individual performance management at the local level.
10
11

12 [when] they try to introduce public measuring, I make contact with the
13
14 director and say... 'there has to be a 100% agreement anonymously in the
15
16 department for them to establish it'...[local managers] usually don't dare to
17
18 do anything else because they know the discussion will go above their head.
19
20

21 (N-DNB-branch rep1)
22
23

24 Most FFB reps had made local agreements allowing managers to collect certain types of
25
26 data and to measure group indicators. At SBk1, for example, the agreement enabled data to be
27
28 collected on a team basis only. Similarly, at a DNB call centre there were agreements about
29
30 which data could be collected and its use, with the union exercising a 'veto'.
31
32

33 The union has said that we don't want to count how many things each member
34
35 does during a day... So, you're making it less convenient to go to each
36
37 separate member to take them and talk to them about how bad their work is.
38
39

40 (N-DNB-call-centre-rep)
41
42

43 In some cases, agreements permitted individual monitoring. One rep (N-DNB-local-rep1)
44
45 noted that some workers wanted feedback 'to show how good they are', or saw it as useful for
46
47 their development. At SBk2, reps had made an agreement on a system whereby only the first-
48
49 line manager had access to individual data on sales and calls, which could just be used for
50
51 coaching purposes. 'Well, if they want a system, they have to agree it with us. So, if we don't
52
53 agree with it, they can't get the system' (N-SBk2-lead rep). In N-SBk3, some departments were
54
55 using individual measurement to pressurise workers, although the data could not be publicly
56
57 shared.
58
59
60

1
2
3 ‘How many problems are you [dealing with] during one day? How many
4
5 times have you been to the toilet... been out smoking or whatever?’ That’s
6
7 one of the things we are working to stop. (N-SBk3-lead-rep)
8
9

10 The lead rep stressed that previous local agreements were ‘not strong enough’.

11
12 At a DNB call centre, union reps had successfully reversed the use of a work management
13
14 package which monitored workers against expected times for each task. The case was taken to
15
16 the Data Inspectorate which ruled against the company. The union combined the legal case
17
18 with a successful ‘name-and-shame’ campaign, with the national and international press widely
19
20 reporting that employees only received ‘eight minutes for the toilet each day’ (N-DNB-lead
21
22 rep1).
23
24

25
26 In UK call centres, the recording and monitoring of service transactions has been endemic
27
28 for years, along with the use of the data to reward and discipline individual staff.
29

30 Every single system that I log into, every customer interaction that I do, every
31
32 refund that I do... is monitored and logged somewhere... it has been viewed
33
34 in the past for colleagues that have gone down the disciplinary route. (UK-
35
36 LBG-call-centre-rep1)
37
38

39
40 More recently, LBG management has attempted to extend surveillance to branches and offices,
41
42 although there were no such moves at TSB. Examples included video recording of mortgage
43
44 and banking advisors’ interviews with customers, recording branch telephone calls with
45
46 customers, and covert videoing of counter-staff by ‘mystery customers’. These recordings can
47
48 be linked to performance management systems. The union officers indicated that while they
49
50 were consulted about recording in branches by senior management and ‘opposed that from day
51
52 one’ (UK-regional-officer1), the bank went ahead anyway.
53

54
55 There was a huge backlash against it, because they [branch staff] did see it
56
57 as being Big Brother is listening to us. (UK-regional-officer2)
58
59
60

1
2
3 A national officer felt it belied the bank's rhetoric of trusting staff, and overplayed issues of
4 under-performance:
5

6
7
8 It feels to me a bit of a sledgehammer to crack a nut. There may be a few
9
10 people that don't sell things very well perhaps, but now every single
11
12 interaction is being recorded. (UK-national-officer2)
13

14
15 Union officers attempted to push-back against these changes, but had not received
16
17 sufficient backing from the wider membership. Interviewees explained that some members felt
18
19 that recordings offered protection against customer complaints. Nevertheless, the union was
20
21 able to pressurise management to remove video recording of customer meetings following
22
23 complaints from many staff. As one rep explained: 'it's now reverted back to recording them
24
25 verbally instead of being filmed' (UK-LBG-call-centre-rep1). In some cases, audio recording
26
27 of calls in branches and bank offices were reduced following local rep intervention.
28
29

30
31 Accord reps typically had little role in the introduction of these forms of controls and
32
33 focused instead on limiting their negative effects. One explained that they had been able to
34
35 restrict who had access to the data and ensure it was only used for coaching rather than as a
36
37 'stick' (UK-LBG-regional-rep). Three reps covering call centres explained that they could not
38
39 influence targets, but two of them claimed to be actively confronting managers if undue
40
41 pressure was placed on workers. This could involve 'a conversation' with the manager and, if
42
43 that failed, going 'down the grievance route' (UK-TSB-call-centre-rep1), in some cases on the
44
45 grounds of excessive 'stress' (UK-LBG-call-centre-rep1).
46
47
48

49
50 In contrast to Norway, Accord's ability to use data protection legislation to restrict
51
52 surveillance appears more limited. A case of secret video recording of branch staff by 'mystery
53
54 customers' at LBG was taken to the Information Commissioner's Office as a breach of data
55
56 protection law. Although the union felt they had a strong case, the Commissioner ruled against
57
58 them. As one union officer exclaimed: 'I was, like, "I can't believe this," you know, big
59
60

1
2
3 business talks a lot louder than a relatively small trade union' (UK-national-officer2). While
4
5 the bank did draw back from covert recording, the union is concerned that digital surveillance
6
7 will continue to creep forwards as there are no limits in the collective agreement, and the law
8
9 is relatively weak and opaque. Another issue that was noted is that if workers do not challenge
10
11 surveillance, it can become normalised, such that 'the accepted level has shifted' (UK-regional-
12
13 officer-1).
14
15

16
17 The findings indicate that attempts by management to extend recording in the UK have
18
19 been opposed by Accord. Despite some limited success, the union is still faced with enhanced
20
21 levels of surveillance. In Norway, FFB has been relatively successful in restricting forms of
22
23 individual digital monitoring that can be linked to performance management, making it more
24
25 difficult for managers to intensify work and pressurise individual workers.
26
27

28 29 30 **Discussion**

31
32 In exploring 'country effect', we first sought to uncover how FFB and Accord attempt to
33
34 influence management decisions around digital technology, given differences in their national
35
36 institutional and regulatory contexts. Representation on the board, the Working Environment
37
38 Act and collective agreements that contain rights to consultation over technological change,
39
40 are important elements of the Norwegian system. FFB were able to draw on these supports to
41
42 secure significant involvement in digital change, with evidence of widespread engagement of
43
44 union reps at company and workplace level. In the absence of a supportive institutional
45
46 environment in the UK, Accord has to rely on voluntary collective bargaining and weak
47
48 legislative provisions. Despite having collective agreements with the two banks, there are no
49
50 formal agreements over technology, and little involvement of workplace union representatives
51
52 in its introduction and use.
53
54
55
56

57
58 Given these different processes, the next step was to examine the effectiveness of the
59
60 unions in shaping work outcomes, focusing specifically on their ability to limit digital

1
2
3 monitoring and surveillance. In the UK, call centres have a long-established reputation for
4 using intensive control mechanisms, including the recording of calls (Bain and Taylor, 2001),
5
6 whereas these have been relatively restricted in Norway (Eurofound, 2020). Accord focuses on
7
8 trying to persuade management to refrain from extending monitoring on the grounds that it
9
10 damages worker motivation and customer service.
11
12
13

14
15 In Norway, FFB has negotiated sector and company collective agreements, underpinned
16
17 by legal protections in the Working Environment Act and data privacy legislation that restrict
18
19 the use of such monitoring and surveillance. These agreements offer enhanced rights to
20
21 negotiate and, in some cases, a ‘veto’ over their use. Research in the IT sector indicates that
22
23 Norwegian unions are not always able to achieve these enhanced agreements (Doellgast et al.,
24
25 2023). In most of the banking cases in our study, outcomes emerge as substantially better in
26
27 Norway than in the UK. Digital technologies, while often enabling individual data to be
28
29 collected, were rarely used openly to measure worker performance. The recording of calls was
30
31 also extremely limited.
32
33
34

35
36 Recent research across a range of sectors in Norway suggests limited resistance or
37
38 concerns by union reps about the monitoring potential of digital technologies (Bråten et al.,
39
40 2023). However, this was not reflected in our research, where the reps recognised the ‘invisible’
41
42 nature of data collection and the importance of challenging its use. While FFB could prevent
43
44 overt control mechanisms being introduced, there was little evidence of union involvement in
45
46 the design or selection of technologies in either country.
47
48

49
50 We can identify two main mechanisms through which institutional power contributes to
51
52 country differences: first, formal rights and, second, the role of workplace representatives. In
53
54 Norway, formal rights enable FFB to make strong sectoral agreements that lay the foundation
55
56 for specific company and workplace agreements requiring union involvement in technological
57
58 change. In the UK, despite Accord having collective agreements with the two banks, it lacks
59
60

1
2
3 any formal rights and has to rely on its own resources if it is to try and influence digitalisation.
4
5 These findings are broadly consistent with the view that neo-liberal economies will generally
6
7 ‘encourage more employer discretion over technology adoption and associated restructuring
8
9 decisions’ (Doellgast and Wagner, 2022:444), compared with countries where unions have
10
11 stronger institutional supports.
12
13

14
15 There are also country differences in the supports available for trade union
16
17 representatives and the rights related to their role which impact on their respective levels of
18
19 associational power. Union reps in Norway have codetermination rights which provide a basis
20
21 for negotiation, consultation and involvement at different levels within a company, including
22
23 over technology. In banking, reps had access to considerable resources, including significant
24
25 facilities from employers in terms of time-off, along with training, legal and technical support
26
27 from FFB. In contrast, Accord has no formal rights for union representatives to meet or consult
28
29 with management. Time-off facilities were far more limited, as were union resources. The
30
31 emphasis was on top-level interactions between Accord senior officers and company
32
33 management rather than enhancing the role of workplace reps. Senior reps in FFB, therefore,
34
35 have more time and capacity to engage with digital change. Workplace reps in FFB are also
36
37 expected to negotiate local agreements and have regular meetings with management. This
38
39 provides opportunities and incentives to develop their knowledge of digital technologies in
40
41 order to engage in the process. In Accord, many workplace representatives have little role in
42
43 relation to technology, which may partly reflect the lack of statutory rights or sectoral
44
45 institutional supports for involving shop stewards in workplace changes.
46
47
48
49

50
51 In explaining why FFB has more involvement and influence in digital change than
52
53 Accord, it is critical to look beyond national institutional and regulatory conditions and
54
55 consider the relative power and capacity of unions within specific sectors and workplaces. In
56
57 other sectors in Norway, such as hospitality and retail, unions have struggled to draw on
58
59
60

1
2
3 national institutional supports to shape digitalisation (Alsos and Trygstad, 2018; AuthorsD). In
4
5 these sectors, workers lack structural power (Wright, 2000) due to their ease of substitutability
6
7 and low skill requirements, and unions confront employers reluctant to involve them in
8
9 technological change. In banking, unions have greater structural power due to a relatively
10
11 skilled workforce and the sector's critical role in the economy. FFB has a strong membership
12
13 base, substantial resources and has been willing to use strike action on occasions (although not
14
15 over technology). As well as structural power, it has a level of associational power that makes
16
17 it difficult to ignore.
18
19
20

21
22 Despite similarities in members' occupations, Accord might be said to have less
23
24 structural power. It is a small union and is heavily reliant upon the support and success of the
25
26 two banks where it has members, whereas FFB operates across the sector. Accord also faces
27
28 strong competition from other unions, and has never resorted to strike action. Notwithstanding
29
30 an informal partnership approach that has delivered high union density, this has not translated
31
32 into strong associational power. Nor has Accord developed the type of active workplace
33
34 representative system that might enable more decentralised engagement with technological
35
36 change.
37
38
39

40
41 These findings echo certain themes that were identified from other studies. In Norway,
42
43 FFB has been able to adapt institutional arrangements to address the challenge of digitalisation
44
45 in the workplace (Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020). Although this article does not specifically
46
47 focus on knowledge and resources, strong workplace organisation and union reps having
48
49 sufficient time and facilities to engage also emerge as important. Company differences in
50
51 Norway were less apparent than in research examining other sectors (eg Cirillo et al., 2020)
52
53 which may reflect the high degree of sectoral coordination. Some differences were found
54
55 between the two banks in the UK but more robust conclusions would require research involving
56
57 a union operating across multiple banks. A theme that emerged that is not considered
58
59
60

1
2
3 extensively in the wider literature concerns relationship between formal and informal union
4 engagement with management (for an exception, see Doellgast et al., 2023). Embedded and
5
6 interrelated systems at multiple level were found to be important in the Norwegian banks in
7
8 dealing with digitalisation. This merits further research in other countries and sectors.
9
10
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12
13

14 **Conclusion**

15
16 This article explores country differences in the ability of unions to shape digitalisation.
17
18 Through a comparison of two unions in the banking sector in Norway and the UK, it finds
19
20 evidence of a strong ‘country effect’ with greater union involvement and influence in Norway.
21
22 The findings make an important contribution to analysing unions’ role in shaping digitalisation
23
24 at the workplace and identifying factors that enable or constrain union influence.
25
26
27

28 By adopting a multi-level analysis that incorporates national institutions, union power
29
30 and resources (Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020, AuthorsB), the research demonstrates the
31
32 interrelationships between these different elements. At the national level, the strength of labour
33
34 institutions and regulations in Norway derives from the long-term, embedded societal power
35
36 of organised labour (Heiret, 2012), which has held up relatively well compared to many other
37
38 European countries (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Baccaro and Howell, 2017).
39
40 These provide an underpinning system of supports and protections for Norwegian unions and
41
42 workers that are not available in the UK where unions have been weakened and marginalised
43
44 over several decades. This ‘system’ means that Norwegian unions also have more financial
45
46 resources available to them. Whether they are able to deploy these supports to influence
47
48 digitalisation, however, depends on the organisational capacity and strength of unions in
49
50 specific sectors and workplaces.
51
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55 The research demonstrates that the Norwegian model of local collaborative working can
56
57 be adapted to deal with digitalisation and exists beyond examples identified in its
58
59
60

1
2
3 manufacturing sector (Dølvik and Steen, 2018; Rolandsson 2020; AuthorsC). It is possible that
4
5 in other well-organised parts of the service sector in Norway, unions may also be able to
6
7 influence digitalisation. The same might apply in other countries with supportive national
8
9 institutions. Critical is effective workplace organisation and the ability to extend and adapt
10
11 existing workplace and company arrangements as with examples found in manufacturing
12
13 (Cirillo et al., 2020; Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020; Haipeter, 2020). Further research would be
14
15 needed to confirm these propositions.
16
17
18

19
20 The research challenges the view that national outcomes are converging (Baccaro and
21
22 Howell, 2017), and underscores the continued salience of ‘country effect’. Institutions still
23
24 matter for unions’ ability to shape technology outcomes. It also emphasises the importance of
25
26 addressing the sector (Bechter et al., 2012), and the need for national institutional supports to
27
28 be supplemented with strong union organisation and resourcing if they are to be effective. The
29
30 lack of enabling institutional supports in the UK limits banking unions’ ability to influence
31
32 decisions around the use of technology, although the question remains whether unions might
33
34 secure more involvement by adopting a proactive ‘bottom-up’ approach.
35
36
37

38
39 This research is limited in that it focuses on two banking unions in Norway and the UK,
40
41 and addresses their influence on digitalisation outcomes only in relation to monitoring and
42
43 surveillance. Further research is required to examine the role of other unions in banking as well
44
45 as to extend this type of analysis to other countries and sectors. International comparative
46
47 research certainly does not provide easy answers to the challenges unions face. By uncovering
48
49 when and why unions make a difference, however, it remains vital in countering the pessimism
50
51 that can easily overtake contemporary discussion of unions’ role in the social shaping of
52
53 technology.
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For Peer Review

Table 1: Interviews

Position	Accord (UK)	FFB (Norway)
National officers	UK-national-officer1	N-national-officer1
	UK-national-officer2	N-national-officer2
	UK-national-officer3	
Regional officers	UK-regional-officer1	N-regional-officer
	UK-regional-officer2	
Union representatives	<i>Lloyds Bank Group</i>	<i>Den norske Bank</i>
	UK-LBG-call-centre-rep1	N-DNB-lead-rep1
	UK-LBG-call-centre-rep2	N-DNB-lead-rep2
	UK-LBG-branch-rep	N-DNB-call-centre-rep
	UK-LBG-regional-rep	N-DNB-branch-rep
	UK-LBG-office-rep	N-DNB-office-rep
	<i>TSB</i>	<i>Sparebank 1 Gruppen</i>
	UK-TSB-call-centre-rep	N-SBk1-lead-rep
	UK-TSB-branch-rep	N-SBk2-lead-rep
		N-SBk3-lead-rep
	<i>Foreign-owned fintech MNC</i>	
	N-Fintech-rep	

Lead rep in FFB refers to full-time union representatives operating at the company level. Regional rep in Accord is the most senior rep in LBG in a country.

ⁱ Applicable to companies with 50 plus employees.