

Article

A Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework for Higher Education Institutions in the United Kingdom

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Version May 10, 2020 submitted to Appl. Sci.

Abstract: As organisations are vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection becomes a significant issue. Capability Maturity Models can enable organisations to benchmark current maturity levels against best practices. Although many maturity models have been already proposed in the literature, a need for models that integrate several regulations exists. This article presents a light web-based model that can be used as a cyber security assessment tool for Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) of the United Kingdom. The novel Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework incorporates all security and privacy regulations and best practises that HEIs must be compliant to, and can be used as a self assessment or a cybersecurity audit tool.

Keywords: Assessment Framework; Cyber Security; GDPR; PCI-DSS; DSPT; NISD

1. Introduction

In an age of information growth, technology plays a key role in shaping all aspects of human life. In the education sector, teachers and students can make use of the ever-expanding resources available, creating a diverse learning experience that caters for many teaching and learning styles. However, with this adoption of technology Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are finding themselves the targets of malicious cyber activities, with a recent JISC report [1] reaffirming that UHEIs in the UK are not well prepared to defend against, or recover from cyber attacks.

Due to their nature, HEIs hold a significant amount of information and accumulated knowledge. As a result they are attractive to threat actors who target research findings, financial data and computing resources. Katz [2] identified that HEIs are under continual risk of cyber attacks. Consequently, HEIs face a constant challenge of balancing public access in the interest of sharing information, whilst protecting their information assets.

A study of businesses students in New England was conducted by Kim [3] on the attitude of students regarding Information Security Awareness (ISA). It was evident in the findings that students who participated found the ISA training important and necessary in improving their knowledge in cyber security. Studies in 2013 by the Kaspersky Lab [4] showed over a period of a year, 91% of organisations surveyed reported their IT infrastructure had been the victim of at least one cyber-attack. Additionally, stated in the report, there was an increase in cybercrime such as email phishing, unauthorised network access, malware and theft of mobiles in 2013 compared to 2012. The study focused on corporate IT infrastructures and it highlighted that for years, IT infrastructures such as those in HEIs had been deficient in terms of security and had always been a target for threat actors.

In the market, there are currently many frameworks available for organisations to adopt to improve the effectiveness of their cyber security. These frameworks support action at both an individual and organisational level. Aloul[5] highlights that for the success and security of any security improvement program adopted by an institution, it is important that students and staff are given training and education in information security

awareness. This should be made part of the risk/security assessment plan adopted by all levels of administration, from students to teachers and all administrative employees as teaching the front-end users, will serve as the first line of defence against attackers [6].

To build a secure environment, providing a relevant security awareness program is the initial step. There should be constant training and education provided to equip students, staff and employees to deal with the latest cyber threats and modern prevention methods [7]. There should also be effectiveness metrics that the institution can measure and monitor. Changes to management and audits can be adopted by the institution to strengthen the level of cyber security[8]. One important set of tools that HEIs can use in order to measure their cyber security readiness and compliance levels is maturity models [9].

Matthew J. Butkovic[10] defined the maturity model as “a set of characteristics, attributes, indicators, or patterns that represent progression and achievement in a particular domain or discipline”. The artifacts that make up the model are typically agreed on by the domain or discipline, which validates them through application and iterative re-calibration. In order to make maturity models more effective, the measurable transitions between levels should be based on empirical data that have been validated in practice. This means each level in the model should be more mature than the previous level. In essence, what constitutes mature behaviours must be characterized and validated. This can be challenging to achieve unambiguously in many maturity models.

Our proposed Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework (HCYMAF) is based on a process methodology called a Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [11]. CMMs were originally developed by the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute (CMU/SEI) to improve the management of software development and have been subsequently used in many other domains, such as cybersecurity. A maturity model defines a set of metrics for measuring organisational competency or maturity in terms of a set of recognised best practices, skills or standards. Metrics are organised into categories and quantified on a performance scale. Using specific rating criteria organisations can measure their performance against these maturity levels.

This paper makes the following contributions,

- It proposes a novel Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework (HCYMAF) for HEIs that can be used in order to conduct a gap analysis against 15 security requirements.
- The proposed framework incorporates several regulations and security best practices into one lightweight online self assessment guide.
- It produces compliance reports against all regulations that the HEI must be compliant with in order to facilitate mitigation plans.
- It can be adapted and expanded in order to be used on other critical sectors of the UK and abroad.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we present related work while in Section 3 we describe our system framework. In Sections 3.4 we present the validation procedure. Finally in Section 5 we conclude this paper and present future work.

2. Related Work

2.1. Essential Components of a Maturity Model

A maturity model should follow a structure to ensure its consistency. It typically includes the components, levels, attributes, appraisal and scoring methods, and model domains. Levels represent the measurement aspect of a maturity model, however if the scaling is inaccurate or incomplete, we may not be able to validate the model and the results produced may not be accurate or consistent.

Attributes represent the main content of the model and are classified by domains and levels. Attributes are defined at the intersection of a domain and a maturity level, which are typically based on observed practice, standards, or other expert knowledge. These can be expressed as characteristics, indicators, practices, or processes. In capability models, attributes also express qualities of organisational maturity (e.g. planning and measuring) for supporting process improvement regardless of the process being modeled.

Appraisal and scoring methods are used to facilitate the assessment. They can be formal or informal, expert-led or self-applied. Scoring methods are algorithms devised by the community to ensure consistency of

80 appraisals and they are common standards for measurement. Scoring methods can include weighting (so that
81 important attributes are valued over less important ones) or can value different types of data collection in different
82 ways (e.g. providing higher marks for documented evidence than for interview-based data).

83 Model domains essentially define the scope of a maturity model. Domains are a means for grouping
84 attributes into an area of importance for the subject matter and intent of the model. In capability models, the
85 domains are often (but not necessarily) referred to as process areas as they are a collection of processes that make
86 up a larger process or discipline (e.g. software engineering). Depending on the model, users may be able to focus
87 on improving a single domain or a group of domains.

88 *2.2. Maturity Model Types*

89 Caralli [12] classified maturity models into three different types, progression models, capability models
90 and hybrid models. Progression models represent a simple progression or scaling of a characteristic, indicator,
91 attribute, or pattern in which the movement through the maturity levels indicates some progression of attribute
92 maturity. Progression models typically place their focus on the evolution of the model's core subject matter (such
93 as practices or technologies) rather than attributes that define maturity (such as the ability and willingness to
94 perform a practice, the degree to which a practice is validated, etc.). In other words, the purpose of a progression
95 model is to provide a simple road map of progression or improvement as expressed by increasingly better versions
96 (for example, more complete, more advanced) of an attribute as the scale progresses [10].

97 For the capability models such as CMM, the dimension that is being measured is a representation of
98 organisational capability around a set of characteristics, indicators, attributes, or patterns, often expressed as
99 processes. A CMM measures more than the ability to perform a task; it also focuses on broader organisational
100 capabilities that reflect the maturity of the culture and the degree to which the capabilities are embedded (or
101 institutionalised) in the culture [10]. Hybrid models merge two abilities; the ability to measure maturity attributes
102 and the ability to measure evolution or progression in progressive models. This type of model reflects transitions
103 between levels that are similar to capability model levels (i.e., that describe capability maturity) but also account
104 for the evolution of attributes in a progression model [10].

105 *2.3. Existing work on maturity models*

106 Evaluation of maturity capability was developed in 1986 by the US Department of Defense for assessing
107 maturity capabilities of Software Engineering processes of the software companies they worked with [13]. This
108 model was later adopted by different domains including cybersecurity.

109 Various cyber security maturity models were developed according to the needs of organisations. Currently,
110 the most popular and widely used maturity models are incorporated into (inter)national standards. For instance,
111 ISO/IEC 27001 [14,15] and NIST [16]; European and American standards for cybersecurity respectively. ISO/IEC
112 27001 was developed based on the British Standard BS7799 and ISO/IEC 17799 to provide requirements, maintain
113 and improve Information Security Management System (ISMS) [13]. ISO/IEC 27001 defines ISMS as a part of
114 the overall management system, which “establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and improve
115 information security” [14,15].

116 Sabillon, et al [17] proposed a Cyber Security Audit Model (CSAM) in order to improve cybersecurity
117 assurance. The CSAM was designed to be used for conducting cybersecurity audits in organisations and Nation
118 States. CSAM evaluates and validates audit, preventive, forensic and detective controls for all organisational
119 functional areas. The CSAM was then tested, implemented and validated along with the Cybersecurity Awareness
120 TRAINing Model (CATRAM) in a Canadian higher education institution. Adler, et al [18] created a Dynamic
121 Capability Maturity Model for Improving Cyber Security. It extends an existing Cyber Security CMM into a
122 dynamic performance management framework. It is a software-based framework that enables organisations
123 to create, test, validate or refine plans to improve their Cyber Security maturity levels. Almuhammadi, et al
124 identified the gaps of the NIST Cyber Security Framework for Critical Infrastructure (NIST CSF) by comparing
125 it to the COBIT, ISO/IEC 27001 and ISF frameworks, and then proposed an information security maturity
126 model (ISMM) to fill in the gaps and measure NIST CSF implementation progress [19]. Miron, et al reviewed

127 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models for providers of critical infrastructure, and provided recommendations
128 on employing capability maturity models to measure and communicate readiness [20].

129 Akinsanya, et al investigated the effective assessment of healthcare cyber security maturity models for
130 healthcare organisations using cloud computing [21]. The finding showed that the assessment practices are
131 sometimes considered ineffective since the measurements of individual IS components were not capable of
132 depicting the overall security posture within a healthcare organisation. The effects of cloud computing technology
133 in healthcare were also not taken into account.

134 The existing maturity models offer a manageable approach for assessing the security level of a system
135 or organisation, however it is difficult to establish sound security models and mechanisms for protecting the
136 cyberspace, as the definitions and scopes of both cyberspace and cybersecurity are still not well-defined [22].
137 Most of the existing maturity models provide a minimum compliance model rather than an aspired cybersecurity
138 model that can address emerging threat landscape. The model should allow multi-users including, management,
139 security experts and practitioners to assess the overall security status of the organisation/system and take security
140 measures to address the weaknesses identified from the assessment. Most of the existing models are measured by
141 qualitative metrics/processes, however quantitative metrics should be essential for security assessment[22,23].

142 2.4. Selected existing models adopted for HEIs maturity assessment

143 Existing models were reviewed for their applicability for HEIs maturity assessment. The basis of our
144 maturity model was formed according to the CMMI [24]. The CMMI was used as it provides an evolutionary
145 path to performance improvement.

146 The starting point of a cybersecurity assessment is the definition of requirements for an Information Security
147 Management System (ISMS) of an organisation. ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management [14,15] is
148 the best-known standard for providing a set of necessary requirements and this was used in our framework.

149 In addition to the evaluation of maturity, our model provides a set of cybersecurity actions and controls to be
150 implemented to close the existing gaps in HEI cybersecurity. For this, we reviewed a number of well established
151 models and selected the most critical ones to be used for HEIs protection from known cyber-attack vectors. The
152 CIS Controls [25] are specifically technical controls that can be used to mitigate from specific attacks. ENISA's
153 guidelines on assessing DSP security and OES compliance with the NISD security requirements [26] provided
154 insight into the self-assessment/management framework for the DSP security against the security requirements.
155 The cybersecurity evaluation tool provided a systematic approach for evaluating an organisation's security posture
156 by assessing operational resilience, cybersecurity practices, organisational management of external dependencies,
157 and other key elements of a robust cybersecurity framework.

158 Except the above models, Citigroup's Information Security Evaluation Model (CITI-ISEM) [27], Computer
159 Emergency Response Team / CSO Online at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT/CSO), The U.S. Cybersecurity
160 Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and its National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education's Capability Maturity
161 Model (NICE-CMM) were also reviewed [27]. These models were reviewed in order to check that we did not
162 miss any important security controls from incorporating them into our framework.

163 The work of Mbanaso et al. titled Conceptual Design of a Cybersecurity Resilience Maturity Measurement
164 (CRMM) Framework [28] was also reviewed and it provided insight into measuring the effectiveness and
165 efficiency of organisation's controls with respect to cybersecurity resilience, and also the steps that can be taken to
166 improve resilience maturity. Lastly, the work of Butkovic and Caralli titled Advancing Cybersecurity Capability
167 Measurement Using the CERT-RMM Maturity Indicator Level Scale [29] provided insight into how the CMMI
168 maturity levels can be utilised to show incremental improvement in maturity.

169 Recently ENISA [30] has published a report that presents a mapping of the main security objectives, between
170 the NISD and the GDPR in order to support organisations in their process of identifying appropriate security
171 measures. At the same time ISO issued the ISO 27701 Standard [31] in order to help organisation establish,
172 implement, maintain and continually improve a Privacy Information Management System by combining the
173 ISMS with the privacy framework and principles defined in ISO/IEC 29100. NIST has also published the Privacy
174 Framework [32] that follows the structure of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
175 (the Cybersecurity Framework) in order to facilitate the use of both frameworks together. It is obvious that all

176 major security organisations and authorities have identified the need for mapping cybersecurity requirements
177 from different frameworks, but until now only initial works that map GDPR with NIST and NISD have been
178 published.

179 Apart from the lack of a security maturity model tailored for HEIs, the other identified gaps in the review
180 of these maturity models occur in the aspect of adoption: the maturity models are either too complicated to
181 implement, or they require the organisation's processes to be refined to suit their implementation. HEIs are
182 having more fluid and less controllable environments, which render many of ISO controls non applicable or
183 introducing too significant barriers for HE to manage effectively.

184 A holistic framework that incorporates all regulations and can be used either offline or online with easily
185 followed and understood maturity assessment metrics was needed for the HEIs. The proposed framework
186 incorporates several regulations and security best practices into one lightweight online self assessment guide that
187 can be run as a self assessment or audit tool. HCYMAF supports the assessment of the maturity of each of the 15
188 specified domains to identify weak and strong practices and can be easily extensible in order to incorporate other
189 domains, e.g. IoT, blockchain [33] etc.

190 3. Proposed Maturity Framework

191 An appraisal is an activity that helps identify the strengths and weaknesses of an organisation's processes
192 and to examine how closely the processes relate to identified best practices. Appraisals are typically conducted to
193 determine how well the organisation's processes are when compared to related identified security best practices,
194 and identify areas where improvement can be made. Our proposed Maturity Assessment Framework (MAF)
195 can be used in order to inform external customers and suppliers about how well the organisation's processes are
196 when compared to related identified best security practices. The model can also be used as a gap analysis and
197 compliance checking tool that any organisation can use in order to define how well contractual requirements are
198 met. The MAF is established based on the following,

- 199 ● A review of security requirements that HEIs must follow in order to demonstrate compliance with the
200 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS),
201 Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT) and any other regulation that may apply to them;
- 202 ● A literature review of existing research on maturity models in cybersecurity as well as in other areas.

203 This framework entitled "A Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework (HCYMAF) for Higher
204 Education Institutes (HEIs)" aims at designing a cybersecurity maturity assessment framework for all higher
205 education institutes in the United Kingdom. The framework can be used as a self-assessment tool by the HEIs
206 organisation in order to establish their security level and highlight the weaknesses and mitigation plans that need
207 to be implemented. The framework is a mapping and codification tool for HEIs against all regulations that the
208 HEIs must comply with, such as the GDPR, PCI DSS, DSPT etc.

209 The framework uses 6 different levels of maturity against which the cybersecurity performance of each
210 organisation can be measured. The framework will be validated through 3 pilot implementations, of which 1
211 has already been conducted with positive results and feedback obtained. This model is important and novel
212 because HEIs, by using this framework will be able to assess the security level of their organisation, conduct a
213 gap analysis and also create appropriate mitigation plans. The model also informs whether the organisation is
214 compliant with the expected regulations thus helping them in self-assessment and improvement by producing
215 relevant compliance reports.

216 It is necessary to design a maturity model that will be able to facilitate the organisations and the National
217 Cyber Security Center (NCSC) of the UK. To achieve this, the model must have the following characteristics. It
218 must:

- 219 ● Cover the full extent of the requirements of the different regulations;
- 220 ● Be able to be used as a self-assessment tool
- 221 ● Be able to be used as a basis for an independent assessment
- 222 ● Provide clear results regarding the security posture of the organisations
- 223 ● Produce compliance reports




Figure 1. HCYMAF requirements are divided into three groups

- 224 • Be able to be used as guidance for implementation of a concrete security policy by the HEIs
 225 • Be measurable
 226 • Be easily extractable and reusable

227 3.1. Security Requirements

228 As illustrated in Figure 1, the proposed maturity assessment model has 15 requirements. The 15 requirements
 229 followed are categorised as ‘General Security Requirements’. The General Security Requirements which is the
 230 foundation of the model is based on cybersecurity best practices such as the CIS Controls, NIST Framework, etc.
 231 The 15 requirements were divided into 3 groups. IDENTIFY (I), PROTECT & DETECT (P), and RESPOND &
 232 RECOVER (R). It should be noted that the DETECT controls of NIST were merged into our protect & detect
 233 requirements in order to keep our model lightweight. The mapping of the different regulation into the HCYMAF
 234 is shown in the upcoming figures 4 - 6.

235 Requirements I1 – I4 fall under Identify, Requirements P5 – P13 fall under Protect & Detect whilst
 236 Requirements R14 – R15 fall under Respond & Recover. All the requirements of the category Identify, are
 237 necessary for the facilitation of the understanding of the business and operational ecosystem of the organisation.
 238 All the requirements of Protect & Detect are necessary in order to detect incidents and protect all assets supporting
 239 the services of the organisation i.e. (people, procedures and technologies). Lastly, all the requirements of Respond
 240 & Recover are necessary in order to respond and manage an information security incident that may have the
 241 ability to influence the provision of the services offered by the HEIs. Finally, it should be noted that some
 242 requirements do have sub-requirements (See Figure 2).




Figure 2. The proposed HCYMAF model in detail

243 3.2. Mapping of Regulations

244 It is worth stating that we incorporated the regulation requirements of GDPR, PCI DSS and DSPT into
 245 our General Security Requirements. This was done by focusing on each individual regulation and mapping
 246 it into one of our requirements. For example, in terms of GDPR, we focused on the 7 principles of GDPR,
 247 as shown in Figure 4 and mapped each of the principles into one of our requirements. For example, the first
 248 principle of GDPR is lawfulness, fairness and transparency. This was mapped into Sub-Requirement P5.1: GDPR
 249 Compliance. The second principle which is purpose limitation was mapped into Requirement P5. Policies,
 250 Processes and Procedures for the protection of the services, and so on.

251 In terms of incorporating PCI DSS. We focused on the 6 principles of PCI DSS, as each of these principles
 252 had its requirements (See Figure 5. In terms of incorporating DSPT, we also focused on the 10 principles of
 253 the regulation and likewise each of those principles was mapped into one of our requirements (See Figure 6).
 254 Overall, all the aforementioned regulations were incorporated into our model and merged to form a solid maturity
 255 model as illustrated in Figure 3.

256 3.3. Maturity levels

257 The maturity model has its maturity levels. This means that each of the requirements and sub requirements
 258 has its own maturity levels. The maturity levels are 6 scores, from 0 to 5, with 0 being the lowest while 5
 259 being the highest. Each of these maturity levels has a meaning, it represents a staged path for an organisation's
 260 performance and process improvement efforts based on predefined sets of practice areas. Each maturity level
 261 also builds on the previous maturity levels by adding new requirements. An example of such a scale is shown in
 262 Figure 4 below. A brief description of each level is presented:

- 263 • Level 0: Incomplete; Ad hoc and unknown. Work may or may not get completed.
- 264 • Level 1: Initial; Unpredictable and reactive. Work gets completed but is often delayed and over budget.
- 265 • Level 2: Managed; Projects are planned, performed, measured, and controlled.
- 266 • Level 3: Defined; the organisation is proactive, rather than reactive. There are organisation-wide standards
 267 that provide guidance across projects, programs, and portfolios.




Figure 3. Merging of different requirements into the proposed HCYMAF

- 268 ● Level 4: Quantitatively Managed; the organisation is data-driven with quantitative performance
269 improvement objectives that are predictable and align to meet the needs of internal and external
270 stakeholders.
- 271 ● Level 5: Optimising; the organisation is focused on continuous improvement and is built to pivot and
272 respond to opportunity and change.

273 In terms of evaluation of the performance of an organisation against an individual requirement, the maturity
274 notes should be read one at a time in ascending order (from 0 to 5). If all notes are fulfilled, then the next level
275 should be read and examined. In order to assign a certain score, all of the lower levels must be completely
276 fulfilled first. It should also be noted that some sub-requirements have a Not Applicable (N/A) option, this is
277 because not all sub-requirements are applicable to every organisation.

278 3.4. Evaluation and Validation

279 The validation authenticates the contribution of the proposed maturity model, HCYMAF, as well as its
280 usefulness, value, capability and operational characteristics. A validation strategy was developed to provide a
281 convincing argument for the model's effectiveness and demonstrated its function within its proposed and realistic
282 environment. It included:

- 283 ● Interview with experts in the field of security and data protection of HEIs (DPO or Cyber Security Officers)
284 in order to identify the different regulations that the HEIs must be compliant with, the best practices that
285 they follow, how do organizations manage the overlap between cybersecurity and data protection (GDPR),
286 the integration of Risk Management and the Privacy Impact Assessment among others. Apart from
287 structured interviews that were sent to the experts, members of the team that developed the framework had
288 many discussions. Using their advice and suggestions the final groups and requirements were developed.
- 289 ● A case study: The objectives of the case study that was conducted include the validation of the proposed
290 structure and categories by adding or removing them from the model, which is expected to make advances
291 to the model, and collect information related to the processes used to manage security in HEIs
- 292 ● Feedback from the scientific community through the submission and presentation of academic papers –
293 A number of research outputs will be produced alongside the study course which further enhances the
294 validation of the research outputs.
- 295 ● A webinar that will be organized and will take place later this year, where HEIs in the UK will be invited.
296 During the webinar, the representatives of the HEIs will be given an overview of the framework, the results
297 of the conducted case studies and the option to run the HCYMAF either offline (through a dedicated excel
298 file and a detailed guide that we have developed) or online through our website.




Figure 4. GDPR Mapping

299 **Structured Interviews with Experts**

- 300 1. What are the regulations universities have to be compliant with?
- 301 2. Are universities in the UK obliged to have a security officer?
- 302 3. How do you conduct the DPIA and Risk Assessment? Do you do it in parallel or one after the other? Is
- 303 data protection impact assessment under Risk Assessment?
- 304 4. Can you please briefly tell us the procedures you follow in order to be compliant with those regulations?
- 305 5. We have some categories that might not be applicable to universities for example ‘security for software
- 306 development’ what is your opinion?




Figure 5. PCI-DSS Mapping

- 307 6. How are the roles and responsibilities between the DPO and the security officer split?
- 308 7. How do you actually merge security requirements and Data Protection requirements during the
- 309 implementation of a new service?
- 310 8. What is the procedure that is followed when a security or data breach takes place?
- 311 9. What would be the added value of a cybersecurity assessment framework? What would you expect from
- 312 such a model?
- 313 10. We have created an initial pool of sectors that our HCYMAF is going to investigate. Do you think that we
- 314 may miss any important category?

315 Before the final model is released to the HEIs, it should be validated through several pilot implementations.

316 The model should preferably be used by organisations of different sizes and regardless of the activities they have,

317 e.g. provide health studies. The first pilot has already been conducted and the team at De Montfort University




Figure 6. DSPT Mapping

318 (DMU) in cooperation with the NCSC has already planned to run the other two case cases in the next period.
 319 In the meantime, the DMU team has released the first version of the website which HEIs will use in order to
 320 perform self-assessments and receive the results in a graphical model and a gap analysis that showcases the
 321 cybersecurity sectors of HEI's IT systems that need immediate actions. Also, compliance reports will be produced
 322 automatically from the HCYMAF, giving the opportunity to the organisation to react fast and avoid penalties.




Figure 7. Maturity levels of the proposed model

323 Each HEI representative will need to register to the platform and then go through the guide. The process can
 324 be paused and continued at a later time since a lot of information and time are needed in order to conduct a full
 325 cyber security assessment. The results for each organisation are only visible to the organisation along with charts
 326 and reports that will help the security and data protection officers to take the appropriate measures. Aggregated
 327 results will be collected and used for analysis by the NCSC in order to prioritise future security plans.

328 4. Discussion

329 Our proposed framework defines a set of metrics for measuring organisational competency or maturity in
 330 terms of a set of recognised best practices, skills or standards. It has incorporated the General Data Protection
 331 Regulation (GDPR), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Data Security and Protection
 332 Toolkit (DSPT) and can be used in order to conduct a gap analysis against 15 security requirements. The metrics
 333 are organised into categories and quantified on a performance scale. The measurable transitions between levels
 334 are based on empirical data that have been validated in practice, and each level in the model is more mature than
 335 the previous level.

336 By applying the proposed framework, organisations can achieve progressive improvements in their
 337 cybersecurity maturity by first achieving stability at the project level and continuing to the most advanced-level,
 338 organisation-wide continuous process improvement, using both quantitative and qualitative data to make decisions.
 339 For instance, at maturity level 2, the organisation has been elevated from ad hoc to managed by establishing
 340 sound security controls, procedures and processes. As a University achieves the generic and specific goals at a
 341 maturity level, it is increasing its maturity and at the same time achieves compliance with relevant regulations
 342 and national laws.

343 Based on the experience we will gain out of this project, we will adapt the proposed HCYMAF for
 344 organisations in other sectors e.g. water, power suppliers, etc in the future. We will incorporate the best practices,
 345 skills or standards that are essential for different sectors. We also aim to create (working closely with the
 346 NCSC) a semi-automated self-assessment online framework. This online framework could be used by all critical
 347 organisations in the UK. The framework will include specific controls like IoT, SCADA, etc. where each

348 organisation will fill the controls that are applicable to them. Finally, the information collected by this online
349 tool will help the UK government to prioritise the mitigation plans related to security that need to be taken at a
350 national level in terms of funding specific actions, launch new security tools, etc.

351 5. Conclusions

352 There have been a number of cyber-attacks upon HEIs around the globe, and the recent JISC report
353 reaffirmed that HEIs of the UK are not well prepared to defend against, or recover from, cyber-attacks. Capability
354 Maturity Models can enable organisations to benchmark current maturity levels against best practices. Although
355 many maturity models have been already proposed in the literature, no model that integrates several regulations
356 exists. Based on this finding, in this article we present a light web-based model that can be used as a cybersecurity
357 assessment tool for Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) of the UK that incorporates all security and privacy
358 regulations and best practices that HEIs must be compliant with.

359 The proposed model consists of 15 security categories, 6 maturity levels and is implemented on an online
360 platform that can be used both as a self assessment and audit tool, facilitating organisations perform a gap
361 analysis, receive automated compliance reports and graphical representation of their security posture. Information
362 that will be collected from the platform can be used, after proper aggregation and anonymisation processes, from
363 the NCSC in order to identify current security problems and prioritise future security plans and funding actions.

364 **Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, A. A., Y. H., and L.M.; Methodology, A. A., L. M., Y. H. and A. C.; Software, A.
365 A., I. Y., and L.M.; Validation, H. J., E. B, A. C., and L. M.; formal analysis, A. A. and H. J., investigation, A. A., Y. H., and I.
366 Y.; resources, A. A., Y. H., I. Y. and A. C.; data curation, A. A., and L. M.; writing—original draft preparation, A. A., Y. H, I.
367 Y., and L. M.; writing—review and editing, E. B., H. J., and A. C.; visualization, A. A., and Y. H.; supervision, L. M.

368 **Funding:** We thankfully acknowledge the support of the NCSC, UK funded project (RFA: 20058).

369 **Conflicts of Interest:** All authors declare no conflict of interest.

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