The Deterrence Theory: A Case for Enhanced Enforcement of Directors' Duties

Date

2017

Advisors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

ISSN

2521-1889
2521-1870

Volume Title

Publisher

Virtus Interpress

Type

Article

Peer reviewed

Yes

Abstract

This article is concerned with providing a justification for effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It aims to consider whether enforcement of directors’ duties is necessary. It argues that enforcement of directors’ duties is crucial to effective corporate governance. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it argues that there is a clear link between increased enforcement and increased compliance. Consequently, enhanced and effective enforcement of directors’ duties is essential for securing compliance.

Description

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link

Keywords

Deterrence Theory, Enforcement, Directors' Duties, Corporate Governance

Citation

Akanmidu, O. (2017) The deterrence theory: a case for enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties. Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review 1(1) pp. 25-31.

Rights

Research Institute