The Deterrence Theory: A Case for Enhanced Enforcement of Directors' Duties
Date
2017
Authors
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
ISSN
2521-1889
2521-1870
2521-1870
Volume Title
Publisher
Virtus Interpress
Type
Article
Peer reviewed
Yes
Abstract
This article is concerned with providing a justification for effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It aims to consider whether enforcement of directors’ duties is necessary. It argues that enforcement of directors’ duties is crucial to effective corporate governance. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it argues that there is a clear link between increased enforcement and increased compliance. Consequently, enhanced and effective enforcement of directors’ duties is essential for securing compliance.
Description
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link
Keywords
Deterrence Theory, Enforcement, Directors' Duties, Corporate Governance
Citation
Akanmidu, O. (2017) The deterrence theory: a case for enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties. Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review 1(1) pp. 25-31.