Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game'

Date

2017-03-04

Advisors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

ISSN

0020-7276

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer

Type

Article

Peer reviewed

Yes

Abstract

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

Description

open access article

Keywords

Public good, threshold, impulse balance theory, quantal response, forced contribution, ordinal potential

Citation

Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2017) Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), pp.1163-1191.

Rights

Research Institute

Institute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)