

LABOUR CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENTAL STATE THEORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALISATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Adam Fishwick, De Montfort University

ABSTRACT

Drawing on historical research on the period of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) in Chile and Argentina between the 1930s and 1960s, this article claims that developmental state theory (DST) on Latin America obfuscates a crucial feature of state intervention in the region. Specifically, despite a long-standing interest in state-society relations, it has thus far been unable to adequately incorporate labour-state relations and labour control in the workplace. This is because, in various guises, DST privileges state-society relations mediated by institutions from which labour is implicitly or explicitly excluded. In seeking to extend the analytical lens of DST, I combine critical labour relations and labour process theories to identify the purposive establishment of ‘regimes of labour control’ via changing institutional and workplace relations. Using this framework, I show how the often-vacillating strategies pursued by the state under ISI in Chile and Argentina and its inefficient outcomes can be better understood by incorporating these efforts designed to exert control over labour.

KEYWORDS: Developmental state, Import-substitution industrialisation, Chile, Argentina, Labour

INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BEYOND DEVELOPMENTAL STATE THEORY

The transformation of leading economies in Latin America has led to renewed attention on the role of the state in development in the region. Declining poverty and inequality under the progressive governments of the so-called ‘pink tide’ have been an important focus in recent debates (Grugel *et al*, 2008; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012). Discussion has ranged from the role of the National Development Bank and redistribution via the Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Hochstetler & Montero, 2013; Ban, 2013) to the ‘return of the state’ and emergence of a new ‘developmental regime’ in Argentina (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2007; Wylde, 2011 & 2012). Nevertheless, recurrent crises have meant well-worn critiques on interventionist states in the region have persisted. In this view, Latin American state-led development continues to be tainted by inefficiencies of populist political economy: overspending, inflation, and structural imbalances that produce inevitable crises (Castañeda, 2006; Santiso, 2006; Edwards, 2010).

These views on Latin American state intervention reflect an understanding that has long underpinned developmental state theory (DST). Proponents have argued that, historically, all successful development has entailed state intervention (Chang 2007), but, also, that not all state intervention has necessarily led to successful development. Import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) during the twentieth century in Latin America is often the archetype of this state intervention gone awry. Although the veracity of criticism varies, it is excessive tariffs, trade protections, welfare overspending, ‘inefficient institutions’, and vacillating approaches to policy making that are contrasted to the efficiency and effectiveness of East Asian states (Lin, 1988; Haggard, 1990; Jenkins, 1991; Taylor, 1998; Felix, 1989; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Huber, 2002; Kohli, 2004; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Schneider, 2017).

However, this critique of the relative limitations of ISI in Latin America and its inability to develop comparably effective state intervention underplays a central feature of state-led development that is shared with East Asia: the disciplining of labour (Deyo 1989, 2012; Gray 2014). In this paper, I show how the trajectories of ISI in Latin America were also shaped by the efforts of the state to control, and to help firms control, labour. To do this, I examine specific cases of leading industrial sectors in Chile and Argentina. Despite relatively strong industrial growth throughout the period of ISI, both countries experienced persistent

structural crises in the well-documented experiences of ‘stop-go’ growth in Argentina and the inability to control inflation and unemployment in Chile (Cárdenas *et al*, 2000; Thorp 1998). But, as in East Asia, I show that ISI in these countries also comprised measures that sought to facilitate growth across leading sectors through the imposition of various ‘regimes of labour control’. Understanding the composition and impact of these regimes, I argue, can then help us to better understand strategies adopted by states under ISI between the 1930s and 1960s.

My central theoretical claim is that DST has thus far been unable to adequately address this centrality of labour-state relations as it privileges state-society relations mediated by institutions from which labour is implicitly or explicitly excluded. In focusing on this centrality, I go some way to addressing Robert Wade’s recent critical assessment in this journal that DST ‘comes close to conflating the developmental state with an effective state, and an effective state with one whose economy is successful’ (Wade, 2014: 789). ISI was not the failure of a regional variant of the developmental state. Instead, I show that DST can potentially be useful for understanding developmental trajectories in Latin America, but that it must also encompass the impact of diverse measures aimed at exerting control over labour.

Following Dae-oup Chang (2013), I understand the state as embodying the ‘social forms through which social relations of domination are inverted into technically equal relations’ (Chang, 2013: 161). He argues that DST relies on understanding state intervention as a politically neutral phenomenon, intended to mediate between competing ‘interest groups’, of which labour is just one amongst many. This reproduces a ‘mystified state’ that conceals its role in sustaining the ‘capitalist social relations behind the political form’ (*ibid*: 93-4).

Consequently, the problem I identify with DST is not normative – it is not simply that it is unfavourable to the interests of labour – but analytical. It has not yet been able to adequately situate relations between labour and the state and the disciplinary role played by the latter in restricting labour’s ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Selwyn, 2014: 21-2). Thus, to extend its narrower understanding of labour-state relations, I combine critical literatures on DST, Latin American labour histories, and critical labour process theory. This combination enables an understanding of how configurations of labour control, exercised through institutional innovations and forms of workplace organisation, influenced ISI in Chile and Argentina.

I organize the paper as follows. First, I identify the institutional bias of DST in understanding state-society relations. I argue that in the diverse approaches it has informed, labour-state relations have been unintentionally marginalised. Second, and building on this, I develop an

approach to addressing this gap in understanding of the role of the state in ISI. I extend my analytical lens to the workplace and to the discipline exercised through work to show how labour-state relations can help explain the trajectory of state intervention. Third, and using this framework, I present four case studies that illustrate how diverse ‘regimes of labour control’ shaped ISI in Argentina and Chile, drawing on new empirical findings from workers’ newspapers and industry journals published in the period. The paper thus provides an alternative reading of ISI that brings labour-state relations to the fore of our understanding, demonstrating how the state-led disciplining of labour influenced the trajectories of ISI.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BIAS OF DEVELOPMENT STATE THEORY IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

Developmental state theory (DST) remains amongst the most influential critical voices in development studies, challenging neoliberal orthodoxy and ‘forc[ing] development studies to confront the conundrum of what concrete institutional features are associated with different developmental outcomes’ (Evans & Stallings, 2016: 24). Focused primarily on East Asia, the first wave of DST reached its zenith by the end of the 1990s, providing insights that convincingly demonstrate the importance of the state (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990; Leftwich, 1995; Amsden, 2001; Chang, 2004; Kohli, 2004; Chang, 2007). In this view, the state must necessarily possess ‘sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives’ (Leftwich, 1995: 401).

Attempts have been made to utilize this fundamental insight outside the unique societal conditions of East Asia, with emphasis on contrasting the relative limitations of state-led development in Latin America (Felix, 1989; Taylor, 1998; Huber, 2002).¹ Ben Ross Schneider (2004, 2017), for example, shows how attempts to establish a developmental state in the region have consistently served only to reinforce patrimonial networks between business and state elites. Moreover, rather than transpose successful institutional

¹ This is not an exhaustive review of the DST literature. Much has been written on its institutional configurations, technical expertise, the exercise of power, and the state in an international context (see Woo-Cummings, 1999 and Haggard, 2013 for these key debates). These debates are important to fully understanding the complexity of state-society relations, but are beyond the scope of this paper that seeks to foreground the impact of dynamics in the workplace.

configurations that emerged in East Asia, DST advocates have sought to unravel why states in the region developed relatively autonomous institutional capacities, while in Latin America they did not. As Jayasuriya (2005), Moon & Prasad (1994), and Kohli (2004) argue, it is essential to move from focusing on the institutional capacities of states *per se* to identify local historical and societal influences on the state. Peter Evans (1995) recognized this interactive dimension of state-society relations with his notion of ‘embedded autonomy’. Autonomy, he argued, was determined by the ability of states to transcend private interests and to retain channels for negotiation with societal actors (Evans, 1995: 10-11). Though successful in South Korea, he argued that Brazil, archetypal of twentieth century Latin America, established an ‘intermediate’ form of embedded autonomy. This comprised ‘pockets of efficiency’, layered state institutions, and the persistence of narrow patronage relations with traditional elites (*ibid*: 60-6).

Building upon this focus on the centrality of state-society relations, Evans (2004) argued for an inclusion of ‘deliberative development’, whereby locally negotiated institutional change was crucial to effective state intervention. This continues the theme of his earlier work, but crucially it opens up the decision-making process to ‘bottom-up’ actors, including labour (see also Robinson & White, 1998). Premised on a critique of the inadequacies of the ‘institutional turn’, he argued that DST had been ‘accompanied by a set of policies that has little more sensitivity to the political complexities of institutional change than older, more-capital-equals-more-development strategies’ (Evans, 2004: 33). He criticised ‘institutional monocropping’ that sought to apply institutional configurations that have worked elsewhere to socially and historically diverse regions. In its place, Evans advocated a deliberative approach that incorporates the local interests of citizens in the planning and implementation of interventions (*ibid*: 40-6). This, he argues, can guard against what he identifies as being overlooked by earlier DST proponents: ‘the real threat of private capture, which comes from capital ... masked by an apparently shared project’ (Evans, 2010: 51-2). Hence the state must not only get the institutional configuration right, but must also pursue forms of participation that directly encourage the influence of a wide array of societal actors, beyond typical elites.

Alternative approaches have been developed on Latin America that reflects these crucial insights on state-society relations. Wylde (2012) argues for a Gramscian interpretation of Pempel’s ‘developmental regime’ to better understand autonomy as reconnecting the state with both society and the international. He combines socio-economic alliances (the social base) behind the state, the institutions that constitute it, and the public policies (or

‘hegemonic projects’) the state pursues to advance and go beyond DST (Wylde, 2012: 77-80). In their work on Chile, Negroita and Block (2012) show how a reworking of DST to reflect the state’s role in mobilizing societal resources through its development of new forms of state power as a ‘developmental network state’ can help us better understand these relations. They argue that successful intervention has tackled ‘network failure’ through a ‘decentralized network of loosely coupled state agencies...offering massive support for domestic entrepreneurs’ (Negoita & Block, 2012: 3-9). Finally, the volume edited by Riesco (2007) challenges critical perspectives on ISI via the concept of the ‘Latin American Developmental Welfare State’ (LADWS)². They argue that this ‘peculiar form’ of state intervention was fundamental to the transformation of the ‘social and productive structures’ and ‘provided lasting and solid bases for subsequent economic and social modernization throughout the continent’ (Draibe & Riesco, 2007a: 1-5; Draibe & Riesco, 2007b: 47).

Yet, despite providing crucial insights into state-society relations in development, there remains an institutional bias at the core of DST.³ Labour, for leading proponents of DST, is an external factor, either placing limited constraints on state autonomy when relatively powerful, as in the case under ISI in Latin America (Kohli 2004), or being subject to the exercise of state power suppressing its demands, as was the case in the industrialisation of East Asia (Amsden 2001). As Selwyn (2014: 51-2) has argued, such ‘statist political economy’ approaches have replicated a bias that privileges relations with firms. Subsequent approaches that offer deliberative, bottom-up, or network perspectives potentially reproduce this by conceptualizing labour as an agent only once it is ‘invited in’ by elite actors through a partial opening of existing institutional configurations. This is because their focus remains on remodelling institutions to which elite actors from foreign or domestic firms, and sometimes trade unions, retain privileged access. The problem of this institutional bias is that it offers too narrow a view of labour-state relations. To echo Chang (2013), this reduces contention over the direction of state intervention to ‘interest groups’ competing for beneficial outcomes, rather than understanding how the state is engaged in the conflict itself in a manner that constitutes both the degree of its relative autonomy and ability to exercise its power.

² See Kwon (2005), in this journal, for an application of this concept to East Asian development.

³ For substantive critiques of the methodological approach associated with DST, see Haggard (2004) and Fine (2013). The insights of the latter on the ‘buzz and fuzz’ of DST is particularly pertinent, namely that there has been ‘total preoccupation with the nation state’ (Fine, 2013: 5) and a reliance on a ‘self-limiting’ inductive methodology that emphasizes successful cases and neglects any examples of failure (*ibid*: 11-14). It is this focus on ‘successful’ cases that is also challenged in this paper.

Therefore, and as has been recognised by an increasing number of critical scholars focusing on successful cases of East Asian state-led development, it is necessary to further develop an understanding of the role of the state in exercising control over labour (Deyo, 1989, 2012; Gray, 2014). Most importantly, as well as being understood as the exclusion of labour from the institutional configuration of the state via, for example, the disregard or repression of trade unions, labour control should also be seen to be exercised through the transformation of work and the workplace. The implications of foregrounding the impact of state development strategies in the workplace are to what I will now turn in this paper. I will show how extending the analytical lens of DST through the concept of ‘regimes of labour control’ can help better understand this crucial nexus of labour-state relations and, in turn, how this helps us to better understand the trajectories of state-led ISI in Chile and Argentina.

RETHINKING LABOUR-STATE RELATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION AND THE WORKPLACE

Labour-state relations are an essential factor in the unfolding trajectories of development, as has been demonstrated in scholarship focused on the incorporation or control of labour in Latin America and elsewhere. This was the centrepiece of O’Donnell’s (1979) work on Argentina and Collier and Collier’s (1991) influential comparative study of labour-state relations in the region. More recently, Minns (2006) has shown how the relative autonomy of the state in Mexico during the twentieth century was achieved by mobilizing ‘bureaucratic mass organisations’ to pursue strategies that opposed entrenched elites (Minns, 2006: 67-75). And, in an important contribution, Gore (2014) argues that change in China has mirrored the ‘labour management’ techniques of East Asia, providing limited support to labour protest to promote increased wages to escape the ‘middle-income trap’ (Gore, 2014: 314).

Such approaches offer an important starting point for understanding labour-state relations in development. They foreground the ‘complex and contradictory patterns of state behaviour’ in development (Howell, 2006: 274) by focusing on how relations with labour institutions are vital both to the exercise of state capacity and for resisting attempts at the private capture of the state by elites. Informing the perspective of this paper, labour historians on Latin America have also shown how attempts to manage the institutional incorporation of labour were

crucial to the outcomes of state-led development in Latin America. In Argentina, the establishment of Peronist trade union federations after 1946 provided relative social stability in exchange for increasing wages and welfare provision (Germani, 1971; Murmis & Portantiero, 2004; James, 1988). These played a ‘dual role’ in coordinating labour protest, but also mediated it to ensure that demands remained within manageable limits (Munck *et al*, 1987: 149-52). In Chile, the ostensible stability of the ‘Compromise State’ during the mid-twentieth century was underpinned by a similar mediating role played by the CUT – the national Chilean trade union federation. Despite only gaining the official recognition in 1971 (Sheahan, 1987: 205; Castillo, 2009: 125), this trade union federation played an important role in mediating and controlling labour protest under ISI (Angell, 1972; Barrera, 1972; Zapata, 1986).

The novel contribution of this paper, however, is to extend this analysis one step further to include analysis of the role of the state in the workplace. This will provide a deeper understanding of the capacity of the state in enforcing forms of labour control, which, in turn, can give rise to new conflicts that impinge upon its autonomy. As noted by Wade (2014: 795), understanding the nature of the state in development requires beginning not from the state itself, but from those state-society relations from which it derives. To do this, I argue, requires bringing production and the workplace to the fore. In what follows, I outline an approach that extends our understanding of labour-state relations in development through a concept of ‘regimes of labour control’ that incorporates the diverse measures adopted by states through institutional incorporation and through the workplace.

Table 1 offers an overview of what I term ‘regimes of labour control’. Research on labour control and development has focused primarily upon the left-hand side of this figure – the institutional measures – aimed at incorporating labour through restriction or co-option. ‘Institutional restrictive’ measures require little explanation. Restrictions on the political organisation of labour, attacks on wages to lower costs, and the removal of labour protections comprise an array of measures utilized to discipline labour. ‘Institutional co-optive’ measures are less explicitly authoritarian and intended to ‘domesticate’ labour (O’Donnell 1979). The forms of labour organisation alluded to above in much of the labour history on Chile and Argentina are the clearest mechanisms for disciplining workers in this manner. As Atzeni (2010: 6-8) argues, such configurations reinforce labour control, existing to negotiate the price of labour rather than confront the relations upon which the purchase of labour-power is

based. They are mechanisms crucial to the reproduction of capitalist social relations and form the institutional context in which the state aids in transforming the workplace.

Table 1: Forms of Labour Control

| FORMS OF LABOUR CONTROL | | |
|--------------------------------|--|--|
| | INSTITUTIONAL | PRODUCTION |
| RESTRICTIVE | <p><i>Directly repressive measures adopted to reduce forms of political and/or workplace representation, including:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal restrictions on organisation, mobilisation, and representation • Freezing of wages and annulling of collective bargaining rights • Removal of legal protections from punitive dismissal | <p><i>Re-organisation of the workplace to maximize discipline either through the fragmentation of labour process or increased oversight, including:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restrictions on representation within the workplace and strict discipline in production process • Fragmenting of work to minimize interaction and improve productivity • Increase in competition within domestic production networks to fragment sectors and force layoffs to restrict labour organisation |
| CO-OPTIVE | <p><i>Measures aimed to limit the scope of social mobilisation through concessions and access to political institutions, including</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of state-mediated corporatist labour relations and strengthening labour bureaucracies • Limited wage increases, increased social spending, subsidies, and price controls • Public sector expansion to reduce unemployment • Expanded welfare provision | <p><i>Re-organisation of the workplace to encourage compliance with changes to labour processes via collaborative arrangements, including:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forms of employee participation in managerial oversight of the production process • Flexible working arrangements and incentives, including paternalist managerial techniques • Support for labour-intensive production to sustain employment levels that reduce tensions and conflicts arising from layoffs |

Recent historical research in Latin America has begun to elucidate the workplace as a central site of labour control under ISI. This has shown the necessity of combining institutionally mediated labour-state relations with discipline and control in the production process. On Argentina, new labour histories have sought to examine the constitution of labour relations at the level of the workplace, challenging the dominance of Peronism, as well as illustrating the significance of the changing character of production processes (Schneider, 2005; Schiavi, 2008; Basualdo, 2010). Similarly, on Chile, the centrality of the workplace as a locus in

exercising control over labour has come to the fore, with research on leading sectors from textiles to copper mining illustrating the complexity of labour-state relations in this period (Winn, 1986; Klubock Miller, 1998; Vergara, 2008). Thus institutional labour control measures do not operate alone, but complement attempts to extend control in the workplace.

By influencing a range of managerial strategies aimed at extending discipline over labour, the state helps establish a constellation of ‘relations *in production*’ (Hyman, 1987; Burawoy, 1985: 10-14) to maximize the degree of labour control. The first set of measures in Table 1 – ‘production restrictive’ – see firms supported in the adoption of strict disciplinary and coercive technologies that reorder work to fragment collective organisation (Braverman 1974; Smith 2006; Taylor 2009). The second set of measures – ‘production co-optive’ – rely on the establishment of consent to such techniques, borne of the internalisation of the priorities of production, the effects of which lead workers to actively participate in their own disciplining (Burawoy, 1985; O’Doherty & Wilmott, 2009; Thompson, 2010).

Restrictive measures maximize the fragmentation of labour to offset the combination and ‘socialisation’ of the production process by dividing it into discrete, competitive units (Lebowitz, 1992: 70-80). The state is central to this process by ‘making’ workers, forcibly incorporating them through dispossession and the transformation of gender roles (Taylor, 2009: 441-4). Such practices undermine the potential of collective socialisation in the workplace. As Atzeni (2010: 27-31) argues, solidarity in work is a pre-existing condition of production to which workers ‘simply have a living encounter’. To prevent this translating into opposition, key mechanisms restrict the ‘indeterminacies’ of labour power – effort and mobility – that enable workers to challenge workplace discipline (Smith, 2006). Restrictive measures, then, fragment the potential solidarity of labour within the workplace.

Production co-optive measures also seek to fragment the latent solidarity to be found in production through the mediation of the worker as a ‘subject-in-process’ (O’Doherty & Willmott, 2009: 945-6). They comprise an array of measures from the transformation of workplace relations, to industrial policy supporting the proliferation of labour-intensive and/or domestic firms that boost employment levels, to the protection of these firms and networks from global competitive pressures. The aim is to secure not just the intensification of work in a structural sense, but also the ‘qualitative intensification of labour’ (Thompson, 2010: 10). For example, measures such as sustaining employment in labour-intensive firms

facilitated such changes, whilst alleviating the potential disruption of mass unemployment. These measures, then, exert discipline via the pacification of opposition to rapid change.

ISI AND REGIMES OF LABOUR CONTROL IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE

Drawing on four case studies based on historical research on Chile and Argentina, I will assess their distinctive ‘regimes of labour control’ and their impact on the trajectory of ISI. The cases show how particular regimes of labour control gave rise to the tensions in leading sectors of industrial manufacturing. They show how efforts by state to resolve crises borne out of earlier configurations of labour-state relations produced new problems. In this way, the four cases illustrate how we can better understand some of the seemingly inefficient and ineffective strategies often ascribed to Latin American ISI. For example, the continuities of labour-intensive production in the textile industry in Chile in the early 1940s combined with support for paternalist managerial techniques that helped newly emerging textile firms to exert control over labour. But it also reproduced conditions of low demand and increased labour militancy that were later addressed via the introduction of ‘rationalisation’ and new Taylorist managerial techniques. Moreover, attempts to introduce advanced manufacturing to Argentina in the late 1950s via the automobile industry were pursued by firms and the state through the fragmentation of both labour representation and industrial structure to limit the potentially disruptive power of industrial trade unions that, after 1946, had been crucial to securing social peace for the expansion of industrial manufacturing in metalworking.

Developments in these sectors were indicative of wider trends across domestic industrial manufacturing in these two countries. Low wages and levels of productivity in the Chilean consumer goods sector contributed to the recurrent crises faced through this period, while the fragmented industrial structure of Argentina’s non-traditional manufacturing sector meant it remained persistently uncompetitive by international standards. But as I show in these cases, a major factor in these outcomes was the pursuit of control over labour within the workplace.

Broadly, this was characterized by institutional co-optive forms of labour control, so I differentiate the cases into those that mainly featured production co-optive forms of control and those that mainly featured production-restrictive forms of control. Examining labour-state relations in the workplace will shed light on the limited ‘success’ of ISI in Latin

America and illustrate the impact of different regimes of labour control. Interestingly, although each of the cases focus on similar combinations of labour control measures, the subsequent trajectories of the two countries can be observed via the limitations of the specific regimes. The failure in Chile, for example, to resolve persistent labour militancy in the workplace led to the adoption of more explicitly restrictive measures of control in production, while in Argentina more effective institutional forms of control helped to constrain this turn.

The approach adopted in the paper sheds new light on how regimes of labour control shaped the trajectories of ISI in Chile and Argentina by bringing together technical accounts of work and the workplace and workers' experiences of these changes.⁴ These cases enable the presentation of an alternative narrative on ISI that shows the constitutive role of labour-state relations to the seemingly inefficient strategies of firms and the state in terms of how state capacity to exert control was limited by earlier configurations of labour-state relations.

Table 2: Regimes of Labour Control in Chile and Argentina

| | INSTITUTIONAL | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---|---|
| | | CO-OPTIVE | RESTRICTIVE |
| PRODUCTION | CO-OPTIVE | <p>ISI Chile: Popular Front and Allende (1939-42 and 1970-3)</p> <p>Argentina: first and third government of Juan Perón (1946-52 and 1973-6)</p> | <p>Pre-1930 Chile: Carlos Ibáñez and Arturo Alessandri (1924-30)</p> <p>Argentina: Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-30)</p> |
| | RESTRICTIVE | <p>ISI Chile: Jorge Alessandri and Eduardo Frei (1958-70)</p> <p>Argentina: second Juan Perón government, Arturo Frondizi and Juan Carlos Onganía (1952-5, 1959-62, 1966-73)</p> | <p>Post 1970s Chile: Pinochet (1973-90)</p> <p>Argentina: Jorge Videla (1976-81)</p> |

Institutional Co-optive, Production Co-optive Regimes

⁴ The primary sources used in this analysis are necessarily fragmentary. One often-overlooked legacy of the military dictatorships that followed this period was to attempt to destroy trade union documents (Erickson *et al*, 1974: 121). Moreover, industry journals reflected the relative novelty of the sectors, with a combination of short print-runs and historical periods often missing issues.

In Argentina, the first government of Juan Perón (1946-52) and, in Chile, the Popular Front (1939-42) both pursued institutional co-optive measures aimed at reducing social conflict to facilitate the rapid growth of industrial manufacturing. Alongside this, control was exercised through a range of production co-optive techniques that, although ensuring a level of discipline during the early expansion, resulted in a resurgence of labour militancy. Initial growth under both regimes was secured through the incorporation of labour, but under terms that limited this relative growth and that were based on an increasing workplace discipline.

The Popular Front in Chile

Under the Popular Front in Chile (1939-42), labour was directly incorporated into the state-led development project through a range of institutional co-optive measures. Unlike in earlier periods of industrialisation, real wages grew significantly alongside industrial manufacturing during these years. The share of manufacturing to GDP grew from 14.4 per cent to 20 per cent from 1939 to 1941 (Fishwick, 2015: 57) and industrial wages rapidly increased relative to the average wages across all economic sectors in the country from 102 per cent in 1940 to 137 per cent by 1942 (Mamalakis, 1980: 315; Fishwick, 2015: 52). Early growth, therefore, was underpinned by substantive links between the state and the trade unions. Labour representatives held positions, for example, in the industrial development agency CORFO established in 1939, with conditions for manufacturing growth were secured through this direct incorporation of labour and new redistributive measures (Moulian, 2009: 31).

This strategy, however, produced a series of new contradictions and tensions in the development of industrial manufacturing. Marginally rising wages and limited redistribution produced vociferous declines in domestic demand for consumer goods and increases in social conflict beyond institutional constraints. This, in turn, led to the stagnation of growth and emergence of the ‘double crisis’ across the sector (Fishwick, 2015: 44). As the new labour leaders defended government strategies as representing the ‘government of the people’ and legal strikes declined (Pizarro, 1986: 119-20; Barrera, 1972: 101), non-legal ‘collective conflicts’ proliferated (Araya, 1946: 9). Institutional co-optive measures were incapable alone of exerting the control over the workplace necessary to continued industrial expansion.

To secure continued expansion of leading sectors, then, production co-optive forms of labour control were developed. In cotton-weaving, and across the leading textile sector, these new

relations in production were characterized by a combination of paternalist managerial styles, loyal adherence to the owner, and a strong disdain for unionisation (Winn, 1986: 31-7). In the words of those working in the industry at the time, employers ‘stalked the factory floor, stopwatch in hand’, adopting personalised monitoring of mostly young, female workers (*Obrero Textil*, 04/10/36, 1:2: 1). The state provided direct support for these measures, increasing import restrictions and prioritising these firms in the 1939 CORFO Development Plan. Textile firms were allocated credit and other funds comparable only to the metalworking industry. After 1940, the state was also directly involved in supporting new firms in woollen goods to artificial fibres (Winn, 1986: 16; Ortega *et al*, 1989: 91-4; Toledo Obando, 1948: 61-2). Support channelled to this sector by the state, therefore, temporarily addressed the problem of workplace control, but at the expense of reproducing the conditions of the double crisis of low demand and the potential of renewed labour militancy.

Peronism in Argentina

Industrial manufacturing expanded rapidly in the early years of the first government of Juan Perón (1946-52). The industrial structure shifted from previously traditional – textiles, foodstuffs, and beverages – to non-traditional sectors – metalworking, electrical products, and chemicals (Sidicaro, 2010: 75). Between 1946 and 1947, GDP rose at an average annual rate of 8.3 per cent, with manufacturing growing at 8 per cent (Cortés Conde, 2009: 185). This was supported by a range of institutional co-optive measures, with membership of state-sanctioned union federations rising dramatically, growing by 371 per cent between 1946 and 1950 to roughly two million and, by 1954, comprising over 55 per cent of the industrial workforce (Belini & Korol, 2012: 121; Doyon, 2006: 244). Real wages rose and the official prices of consumer goods were kept below world market prices – real wages in Buenos Aires, for example, rose from an index of 100 in 1943 to 181.4 in 1949 (Munck *et al*, 1987: 144).

Nevertheless, by 1948, the momentum behind this growth collapsed and, between 1948 and 1952, the economy contracted at an average annual rate of 1 per cent, with manufacturing falling by 1.4 per cent (Cortés Conde, 2009: 188). Efforts to contain labour militancy in the newly expanded trade unions thus required control to also be exercised in the workplace. For example, in metalworking, unionisation grew from only 5,992 unionized workers in 1945 to over 118,000 in 1954 (Doyon, 2006: 119, 247 ff. 7 & 266). Yet despite the advent of the crisis in 1949, workplace mobilisation went into decline (*ibid*: 247). As detailed in industry

journals at the time, throughout the 1950s firms raised demands for ‘greater restraint and understanding’ in the pursuit of productivity increases, workplace rationalisation, and fewer workers operating under firmer discipline (*Metalurgia*, 5/50, 15:118: 127; *Metalurgia*, 9/51, 17:133: 3). Moreover, the internal commissions – union bodies based within the factories – played a vital role. On the one hand, they were essential to the independent organisation of workers in Argentina. They expanded political representation, monitored the implementation of labour legislation, provided a direct channel between workers and their leadership, and transformed the balance of power in the workplace. On the other hand, they constrained mobilisation thereby helping to ensure discipline in the workplace (Basualdo, 2010: 87-9).

The relative effectiveness of this control exercised through a combination of institutional and production co-optive measures were vital to the initial expansion of new sectors of industrial manufacturing under Perón. But they also highlight the new tensions that would emerge. Faced by increasingly powerful trade unions, the demands for restraint called for by domestic firms as work rhythms were ‘rationalised’ and intensified and wages suppressed in the wake of recurrent crises made any further transformation increasingly contentious.

Institutional Co-optive, Production Restrictive Regimes

The crises that had emerged in the 1950s and 1960s produced a shift in the regime of labour control adopted in Chile and Argentina. States turned to supporting firms in the expansion of production restrictive measures of control in the workplace. Eduardo Frei in Chile (1964-70) and Arturo Frondizi in Argentina (1958-62) sought to continue with the institutional incorporation of labour, but also supported new techniques for exerting control through rationalized production relations. This ‘disciplinary modernisation’ (Fishwick 2015) marked the next phase of ISI in these two countries, with attempts to introduce advanced technology and labour processes to leading sectors tied to exerting control over labour in the workplace.

The Revolution in Liberty

The development strategy of Eduardo Frei (1964-70) combined state intervention, support for foreign investment and large domestic firms, liberalisation of trade and investment, and wage and social policy concessions (Ortega *et al*, 1989: 178-80; Moulian, 2006: 227; Stallings,

1978: 67 Ffrench-Davis, *et al* 2000: 134-5). In terms of growth and productivity, its impact was mixed. Increased foreign investment and technology imports consolidated ‘protected inefficiencies’ rather than produce any structural change (Ffrench-Davis, *et al* 2000: 117). The double crisis continued with the value of manufacturing to overall GDP stagnating, as overall growth fell to 3.6 per cent (Fishwick, 2015: 67; Mamalakis, 1976: 163) and as wages continued to stagnate, with labour’s share of national income falling from 36 per cent in 1960 to 14.8 per cent in 1969 (Paris & Porcell, 1966: 50; Muñoz, 1967: 10; Araya, 1969: 26).

New institutional co-optive measures of control failed to address the increasing labour militancy. The national labour federation, the CUT, was legalized and there was a surge in union membership in smaller firms. By 1968, 70 per cent of members came from firms of between twenty-five and thirty-nine workers (Sigmund, 1977: 43; Angell, 1969: 34-5; Pizarro, 1986: 172-3). The PDC also attempted to establish more ambitious measures, including ‘Social Collaboration Councils’ to prevent strike action, a ‘Frei-ist Workers’ Front’, a framework for legally established cooperatives and ‘workers’ enterprises’, and the introduction of a ‘Workers’ Capitalization Fund’, which was to be constituted by a matching 5 per cent salary contribution from employers and workers and a concomitant 20 per cent wage increase. However, each of these institutional co-optive measures was met with increasing levels of resistance (Figueroa, 1966: 53-5; Salazar & Pinto, 2010: 43; Stallings, 1978: 110), highlighting the limits of these measures to establish control.

Alternatively, new techniques of labour control in the workplace were supported, particularly in terms of the technical transformation of work. At Yarur, the leading cotton textile firm, Taylorist relations in production were accompanied by the dismissal of over 1000 ‘rebel’ workers. By 1965, this was spread throughout the sector, with increased Taylorist work rhythms and strict managerial discipline (Winn, 1994: 30-1). The state was instrumental in supporting such strategies. CORFO played a vital role in the renewal of technological capacity in a sector that, as outlined in the industry journal *Chile Textil*, was already ‘capital-intensive’ and under-utilizing existing plant and machinery (Ortega, *et al* 1989: 196; *Chile Textil*, 1966, 254: 11-13; Winn, 1986: 25-7). The Yarur company journal, *Revista Yarur*, moreover, outlined the benefits to the firm of the scientific reorganisation to ‘maximize productivity’ and the ‘perfection’ of ‘new’ female workers and recent rural migrants (*Revista Yarur*, 03-05/68, 14: 12-13 & 18). These measures, consequently, were central to reproducing ‘protected inefficiencies’ as new technology offered limited structural change in the sector.

Developmentalism in Argentina

Under the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-62), there was a concerted effort to expand advanced, non-traditional industrial manufacturing, most notably in the automobile sector. Unlike under Perón, the state openly backed foreign multinationals that became increasingly prominent as the state liberalised profit remittances and prioritized lending to large firms with over 300 employees (Sikkink, 1991: 91-92; Brennan, 1994: 37-38; Brennan & Rougier, 2009: 110). These large firms increased from 1,413 establishments in 1954 to 1,645 in 1964, with around 40 per cent foreign subsidiaries or their affiliates (Schvarzer, 1996: 230).

Under these conditions, there was substantial growth in non-traditional industries between 1956 and 1961 (Schiavi, 2008: 63). Automobile production led this upturn, with Ford, General Motors, Citroën, Peugeot, Chrysler, Mercedes, and FIAT engaging in joint ventures or opening new subsidiaries (Nofal, 1989: 26-7; Fishwick, 2015: 163). But to circumvent the challenges of the trade unions established after 1946, the sector was increasingly fragmented (Fishwick 2014). Firms imported second-hand technology and established factories at 10 to 15 per cent of the typical size. By 1960, only Kaiser, Ford, and General Motors produced more than 10,000 units, despite comprising 80 per cent of total output, with their nineteen factories each producing fewer than 3,000 units annually (Guillen, 2001: 4; Katz & Kosacoff, 1989: 54; Fishwick, 2015: 163; Zarrilli, 2004: 131). Domestic suppliers followed strict blueprints from foreign firms demanding sudden changes that then heightened fragmentation in the workplace (Belini & Korol, 2012: 183; Jenkins, 1984a: 68; Nofal, 1989: 31).

Production restrictive measures were thus extended across the leading automotive sector. They manifested in labour processes that combined outdated technology with simple, repetitive tasks using obsolete tools and higher levels of manual handling (Nofal, 1989: 90; Jenkins, 1984b: 52). Any productivity increases were secured through control exercised via a harsh 'proto-Taylorism' that was enforced and supported by the imposition of strict authority from managers and foremen (Catalano & Novick, 1998: 32; Brennan, 1994: 90-91; Brennan & Gordillo, 2008: 314-6). An insight into the labour process is provided by a US union leader who, upon touring the General Motors plants in Argentina, noted how 'deliberately archaic... special low production machinery' was prevalent throughout the workplaces he visited (Leo Fenster cited in Frank, 1972: 109). To exert control over labour on the factory floor, the structure of the industry and of production was fragmented between multiple firms and by

relatively backward production technology and labour processes. Such a process of ‘disciplinary modernisation’ thus produced limits to further development of the sector and, with the heightening discipline, increased the possibility of workplace conflict.

CONCLUSION: LABOUR CONTROL AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

Each case shows how labour-state relations – and the continuing efforts to exert control over labour by firms and the state – were central to the trajectory of state-led development. They illustrate how problems that emerged within key leading sectors of industrial manufacturing – the ‘protected inefficiencies’ of the textile sector and the fragmentation of the automobile sector, for example – were influenced by the establishment of particular regimes of labour control. As has been widely shown in the case of East Asian developmental states, the centrality of highly restrictive measures of labour control at the institutional and workplace levels were central to the rapid growth and development of countries in the region, particularly in the case of South Korea (Deyo 1989, 2012; Gray 2014). What has been less considered within DST, however, is the diversity of regimes of labour control and their different effects. By considering how state-led attempts to control labour in Latin America helped produce ISI as what is often considered as the antithesis of the successful developmental state, I return to the critical claim made by Robert Wade (2014). Through the extension of DST to a broader consideration of the role of labour control, we can begin to avoid the conflation of ‘the developmental state with an effective state’ (Wade, 2014: 789).

Consequently, I show how the unfolding trajectories of ISI can be better understood through DST via the incorporation of state strategies aimed at limiting labour’s ‘room for manoeuvre’, particularly within the workplace. The ‘stop-go’ trajectory of industrialisation during this period in Argentina was conditioned by the efforts of the state under Perón and later Frondizi to exert control over labour. Under Perón, labour’s pacification was secured through wage and welfare increases and a restructuring of work, a process that was vital to securing early growth in leading manufacturing sectors such as metalworking, but that led to new tensions as firms sought to rationalise the workplace. Under Frondizi, this rationalisation of production was pursued in non-traditional sectors, such as automobiles, with firms

supported in the expansion of production restrictive relations. These transformations, in turn, produced heightened fragmentation alongside limited technological advancements. In Chile, the contradictory expansion of consumer goods production, illustrated by the low productivity and ‘double crisis’ of the textile industry, was also shaped by a similar process. Under the Popular Front, the institutional incorporation of labour, bolstered by paternalist, production co-optive measures of control in the workplace, was essential to the initial growth of the textile industry. But with renewed labour militancy and stagnation, the turn under Frei to attempts to establish a deepening of production restrictive measures failed to address these problems, extending the crises faced throughout the sector and increasing workplace conflict.

Thus far, DST has not adequately addressed the significance of what I have termed these regimes of labour control and their role in influencing diverse trajectories of state-led development. In particular, although it has incorporated the impact of state-society relations and the importance of some institutional measures of labour control, it has not yet extended this to understanding the impact of state intervention in the workplace. Yet as I have shown through analysis of regimes of labour control in Chile and Argentina under ISI, measures implemented in the workplace were vital to different trajectories of development in these two countries. When understood through this lens, the vacillations and inefficient outcomes of state intervention often highlighted in the literature can be seen as less about limits on state autonomy in mediating between competing interest groups, but rather as the result of measures aimed at suppressing conflict over the very trajectory of this development itself.

Despite the changing character of the state and of state-society relations in recent decades, state-led development in Latin America is still understood as riven by a range of inefficiencies. Consequently, important lessons can be drawn from the historical cases informing the argument of this paper. First, proponents must take great care when elaborating the progressive potential of the developmental state. By definition, efforts to discipline labour are premised on the disciplining of labour in work. Emphasizing any progressive institutional innovations of states neglects the often-parallel imposition of workplace control. Second, emphasis on discipline must go much further than the strengthening of the state’s restrictive capabilities against domestic and international firms. This reproduces a neutral – or ‘mystified’ – characterisation that neglects its key role as a disciplinary agent for consolidating discipline and control over labour. Bringing labour-state relations in the workplace to the fore negates any neutrality. Finally, the foregrounding of labour control can provide an important starting point for articulating a genuinely progressive understanding of

state-led development. Understanding labour's significance can offer space for understanding how opposition to these strategies can potentially engender an alternative, or 'labour-centred', approach to development (see Selwyn, 2015, 2016; Fishwick & Selwyn, 2016).

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